Outside the Lines

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Chairman's Letter

Hope to see many of you at the upcoming SABR convention in San Mateo., June 25-28. The Business of Baseball Committee meeting is tentatively scheduled for 8:00 AM Saturday, June 27 – opposite the Retrosheet meeting. (Sorry, Dave, Dave and Sherri.) I'll also be giving a presentation on "Thirty Years of Collective Bargaining Agreements." On most other weekends this summer, you can find me at the Hall of Fame Library in Cooperstown, taking advantage of its weekend hours.

Thanks to all who have contributed material to the Committee archives, including E-mailed newsclips from **Cliff Otto, John McMurray**, and **Larry McCray**; articles from **Francis Kinlaw** on North Carolina's defeat of the stadium referendum, **Michael Bauer** on the proposed new Pittsburgh park and **Cappy Gagnon** on the Hillerich & Bradsby bat suit; material from the early 1990s on a proposed new league from **Tim Phares**; and materials relating to the current CBA from **Dan Marburger**. Special thanks to Barry Mednick, who donated a complete run of *USA Today Baseball Weekly* to the Committee.

MLB News

J.D. Drew loses bid for free agency. See article below.

Opening Day payrolls set new high. According to an AP survey, the 840 players on Opening Day 1998 rosters or the disabled list earned an average $1,441,406, up 4.2%. The median salary rose from $450,000 to $500,000. Baltimore set the pace, with a $69 million payroll; Montreal trailed at $9.2 million. 317 players earned at least $1 million; of these, 216 (more than 2/3) earned $2 million or more.

Owners go 5-3 in arbitration hearings. Nonetheless, the 81 players who filed for arbitration saw their salaries increase by an average of 150%, from $774,323 to $1,936,400. This increase was slightly below 1997's record 154% average raise for arbitration filers. Milwaukee's Jeromy Burnitz paced the players with a fifteen-fold increase, from $225,000 in 1997 to a $3,625,000 average over the course of his new four-year pact.

Owners mulling abolition of DH. Shortly before Opening Day, owners gave the MLBPA one year's notice that they may abolish the DH after the 1998 season. MLB contends that the DH is a playing rule, which under the Basic Agreement can be altered unilaterally on a year's notice, while the MLBPA asserts that its consent is required. The DH issue is tied to the continuation of interleague play, which must be re-authorized by the MLBPA for 1999 and beyond.

Pete Rose damages already-minimal chance for reinstatement. Rose violated the lifetime ban he accepted from then-Commissioner Giamatti in 1989 by talking to Reds farmhands during spring training for an hour. Although Rose recently filed for reinstatement, Acting Commissioner for Life Bud Selig indicated that before considering Rose's petition, MLB will take up Ted Williams' bizarre request to reinstate Shoeless Joe Jackson, a man who admitted under oath that he received $5,000 from gamblers to throw the World Series.

Ticket prices rise an average 10%. According to *Team Marketing Report*'s annual survey, the average ticket now costs $13.60. The Red Sox and Yankees became the first clubs to top $20, while the average cost to see the Twins and Reds remains below $8.50. (By contrast, the average NBA ticket costs more than $36 -- almost three times as much.)

Around the Majors

Boston: The Red Sox are reportedly considering construction of a new park across the street from Fenway Park, which would remain in use during construction. "Save Fenway Park," a local group, has submitted a plan to preserve Fenway's field dimensions while enlarging capacity by 10,000 seats.

Cincinnati: The Cincinnati *Post* reported that MLB is leaning on Marge Schott to sell her interest in the Reds before her suspension expires on November 1, threatening to extend her suspension for allegedly involving team employees in a scheme to inflate sales figures from her car dealership. MLB denies pressuring Schott. Jacore Communications, which owns the club's flagship radio station, may bid for the club.

Cleveland: The Indians' Richard Jacobs seeks to become the first owner in decades to sell shares in the club directly to the public. The offering, which could raise up to $62.6 million, would be geared toward Tribe fans, not investors – the public offering would take the form of a new class of stock with essentially no voting rights. (MLB's new rules authorize public offerings, but require the controlling owner to retain at least 10% of the equity and 90% of the voting rights.) The Indians' filings report an operating loss of $5.0 million in strike-interrupted 1994, followed by profits of $7.02 million in 1995, $7.73 million in 1996 and $8.2 million in 1997.

Detroit: Tigers owner Mike Ilitch borrowed $145 million from Sumitomo Bank, collateralized by future revenue streams, as the team's contribution toward the estimated $260 million cost of a new stadium, which is presently set to open in time for the 2000 season. The Tigers remain responsible for cost overruns.

Florida: At the spring meetings, MLB's Ownership Committee approved Marlins president Don Smiley as the club's future principal owner. Meanwhile, in the wake of the Sheffield/Bonilla/Johnson/Eisenreich salary dump to rent Mike Piazza and Todd Zeile, several season ticket holders have sued the Marlins for fraud,

Kansas City: A partnership of Chiefs owner Lamar Hunt and Western Resources, a local utility, has become the strong favorite to acquire the Royals from the foundation which has owned the club since Ewing Kauffman's death.

Los Angeles: By a 27-2-1 vote, major league owners approved Rupert Murdoch's purchase of the Los Angeles Dodgers, a deal estimated at between $311 and $350 million. Long-time Murdoch antagonist Ted Turner attended his first owners' meeting in nine years, missing a Time Warner board meeting, to vote No; he was joined by White Sox owner Jerry Reinsdorf. The New York Mets abstained.

Minnesota: The Twins' future remains in limbo following the overwhelming defeat of a referendum in Guilford and Forsyth Counties, North Carolina which would have raised taxes to fund a stadium for the club in the Triad region (Greensboro-High Point-Winston-Salem). The proposal which lost 67-33 in Guilford County and 59-41 in Forsyth County, would have raised $13 million/year for 20 years through a 1% sales tax on restaurant food and a 50-cent surcharge on tickets at the proposed stadium. Meanwhile, in financial statements filed with Minnesota stadium authorities, the Twins claimed a $26.4 million operating loss from 1995-97, and a mediator agreed with their position that these losses and low attendance entitled the club to terminate its lease at the Metrodome after 1998.

New York: According to published reports, Cablevision, owner of the Yankees' broadcast rights, proposed to buy the club for an estimated $500 million. Negotiations broke down over George Steinbrenner's insistence that even if the team is sold, he and his family retain operating control for 15 years.

Following the collapse of a steel expansion joint at Yankee Stadium, George Steinbrenner and his new PR man, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, called once again for a new $1 billion stadium for the Yankees on Manhattan's West Side. Meanwhile, the Mets unveiled the design for their own proposed 45,000-seat, $500 million park, with retractable dome *and* retractable field, to be built next to Shea Stadium. Look for much more on these in a future newsletter.

Oakland: Disgusted over their second-class status at the Coliseum, the Athletics are considering possible moves to San Jose or Las Vegas.

Pittsburgh: The Pirates continue to negotiate with local authorities over their contribution to a planned new $228 million, 38,000-seat baseball-only stadium. The Pirates have offered $35 million, but the government wants more

The Docket

Old-time players win minor victory in royalty suit. After a two-week trial, the suit brought on behalf of 384 old-time players seeking a greater share of MLB's licensing money ended with a jury verdict awarding the players a total of $58,000 plus interest., or approximately $151 each. The jury rejected all of the plaintiffs' fraud claims. That the verdict didn't even cover his firm's disbursements during trial didn't stop the plaintiffs' lead attorney, Ronald S. Katz of New York's Coudert Brothers, from proclaiming in a press release, "It's historic and will absolutely open the floodgates against Major League Baseball."

Minnesota fights back over Twins' threatened move. The State of Minnesota has launched an antitrust investigation of MLB in connection with the Twins' threatened move to North Carolina. "Available evidence suggests that respondents' threat to remove professional baseball from Minnesota may constitute an illegal boycott, a price-fixing agreement or the unlawful use of monopoly power," stated Attorney General Hubert H. Humphrey III in papers filed before a state-court judge. The judge later rejected MLB's motion to dismiss the matter, ruling that MLB's antitrust exemption applies only to player transactions, not to franchise moves.

Hung jury in dispute over signatures on bats. A federal jury in Louisville couldn't decide whether hometown boys Hillerich & Bradsby had exclusive rights to manufacture bats bearing the signatures of major league players. H&B had sued the Major League Baseball Players' Association and Heavy Hitter Industries Inc., a California company which had been manufacturing souvenir bats since 1995 under license from the MLBPA.

MLB settles suit with Yankees, adidas. The settlement gives adidas licensing and advertising rights to MLB logos, but not entry into the market for official uniforms and jackets. The Yankees also agreed to pay MLB's legal fees, and in return MLB lifted George Steinbrenner's suspension from the Executive Council.

Federal judge rejects MLB trademark claims in suit over baseball cards. Judge John Martin of the Southern District of New York denied Major League Baseball Properties' motion for a preliminary injunction to block Pacific Trading Cards from selling cards of players in their team uniforms. Pacific had licensed the players' images from the MLBPA, but had not licensed the team uniforms from MLB. In rejecting MLB's request, Judge Martin ruled that Pacific's continued sale of the cards during the pendency of MLB's lawsuit was unlikely to result in the source confusion which trademark law is designed to prevent, because likely purchasers of the cards wouldn't know or care who licensed them. MLB has vowed to appeal the decision, which if upheld could cost it millions of dollars in licensing money by allowing other manufacturers of licensed goods to deal only with the MLBPA.

The J.D. Drew Saga, by **Doug Pappas**

Imagine a system which allows Major League Baseball to sign hundreds of players each year for a fraction of their market value, with no protest from the Players' Association. Now imagine the owners' own ineptitude threatening to destroy this system. This is the story of J.D. Drew, Scott Boras and the amateur draft.

The owners instituted the amateur draft in 1965 to keep themselves from bidding up the value of top prospects. While the reserve clause bound players to their organization for life upon signing their first contract, amateur players remained free to sign with whichever club offered the most money. This freedom allowed untested 18-year-olds to sign for more up-front cash than a veteran could earn in ten years. But after Rick Reichardt used his bargaining leverage to extract a $205,000 signing bonus from the California Angels in 1964, MLB decided to eradicate this sliver of free market.

The result was the amateur draft, which, from the owners' perspective, proved an instant success. In its first year, #1 pick Rick Monday signed for $104,000, barely half of what Reichardt had received the year before. The next three #1 picks signed for $75,000 each. Reichardt's bonus remained the most ever paid to an amateur until the Mets signed Darryl Strawberry for $210,000 in 1980 -- but by then, Strawberry's bonus was only 150% of the average player's salary, compared to the 1400% Reichardt had obtained.

The amateur draft was that baseball rarity, a successful, legal way to reduce salaries. Baseball's antitrust exemption and precedents from other pro sports effectively kept disgruntled draftees from challenging the process in court. The Players' Association didn't object to the draft: it doesn't represent draftees, and its members knew that money not needed to sign amateurs would likely wind up in their own pockets.

The draft allows major league clubs to obtain exclusive negotiating rights to players completing their senior year of high school. A player who opts for college is again eligible for the draft after his junior year. The drafting club retains exclusive negotiating rights until one week before the next year's draft, in which unsigned players can again be drafted. The draft thus keeps salaries down by forcing players either to sign with the drafting club, or to sit out a year in hopes of receiving a better offer from someone else.

The draft rules defined draft-eligible players to include those who had never "signed a professional baseball contract." When they were written, "professional baseball" included only major league clubs and their minor league affiliates -- but after the Northern League and other independent minor leagues formed, the rules weren't amended. Scott Boras, a former Cardinals and Cubs farmhand who had become one of the game's most powerful agents, saw a loophole.

Boras represented Jason Varitek. Now a Red Sox catcher, in 1994 Varitek was a Georgia Tech senior hailed as the year's best catching prospect. The Seattle Mariners drafted Varitek in the first round of the 1994 draft, but when Seattle refused to meet his asking price, Varitek signed with the St. Paul Saints of the independent Northern League. Boras asserted that since Varitek had signed a professional contract, under MLB's own rules he was no longer eligible for the draft and would become an unrestricted free agent one week before the 1995 draft. The Mariners averted a showdown by signing Varitek before the deadline.

At the time no one knew what a player like Varitek would be worth in the open market. That would soon change, thanks to a series of mind-boggling blunders by club executives. Major league rules require clubs to tender contracts to their draft picks within 15 days after selecting them, but in 1996, only *one team* met this deadline. As a result, four of the top 12 picks sought and won free agency. #2 pick Travis Lee soon signed a four-year, $10 million contract with the Arizona Diamondbacks, a deal worth $7.5 million more than #1 pick Kris Benson received from Pittsburgh. Now everyone knew the stakes.

MLB tried to close these loopholes before the 1997 draft -- but it missed one. While the rules relating to contract tenders were amended to give clubs the opportunity to cure any violations without losing rights to their draftees, as of draft day, the definition of "first year player" in the Major League Rules still included Northern Leaguers. This left open the tactic Boras had recommended to Varitek. In 1997, Boras represented Florida State outfielder J.D. Drew. Drew, picked #2 in the 1997 draft by the Phillies, demanded "Travis Lee" money of $11 million; the Phillies countered with a "standard" offer of $2.05 million. When the Phillies wouldn't budge, Drew signed with the Northern League; Boras declared that he would become a free agent a week before the 1998 draft.

Months later, MLB revised the rule to "clarify" that players who had signed only with independent leagues were still subject to the draft: Drew could play in the Northern League until he was 40 without ever being able to choose his own major league employer. Drew and Boras fumed. They could have sued over the rules change or the draft itself, but such a battle could keep Drew out of the majors for years, and the courts have repeatedly affirmed the legality of the NFL and NBA drafts.

Enter the Players' Association. While Drew wasn't eligible for membership in the MLBPA, the union was determined to protect the principle, established in a prior arbitration, that MLB couldn't change the draft rules without its consent. And by bringing the matter to baseball's independent arbitrator, the MLBPA could bypass the courts and obtain a ruling on Drew's status before the 1998 draft. Management spokesmen warned that a ruling for Drew could render the draft obsolete.

On May 19, arbitrator Dana Eischen upheld the MLBPA's grievance -- but Drew may not benefit from the ruling. Rather than declaring Drew a free agent, Eischen held that because Drew wasn't a member of the MLBPA, his rights weren't subject to arbitration. Drew's status will therefore be determined by the Executive Council, which is virtually certain to send him through the draft once again. If they remain dissatisfied, Boras and Drew can now turn to the courts for redress, armed with Eischen's ruling. Thus the J.D. Drew saga is not over -- and the Northern League remains an option for draftees dissatisfied with their offers. Let's see what happens with the draft Class of 1998.

Competitive Ecology, by **Keith Woolner**

A discussion on the Boston Red Sox Internet Mailing List a couple of years ago brought up the issues of long-term competitiveness. How do we expect the pool of strong teams to change over time? Are smaller market teams doomed to remain uncompetitive, or is there an exploitable niche for them in the overall scheme?

The following essay was written as a response in that debate, and has been edited for context, but not for content.

What expectations do we have about a team's competitiveness in the long run? Assuming that all teams were of equal strength in the long run, and that each season was independent of the others, then you'd expect that in any given season, each team in an N-team league would have a 1/N chance of winning the championship. That is, given 12 equally matched teams, each team would start the season with a 1/12 (8.3%)

chance of winning the pennant. Over the long haul, the expected value of the number of championships won by a given team over N years is one. Mathematically, we expect one championship for a team in our league over a 12-year span.

However, there are problems with both assumptions that cause problems in the real world with the simple case analysis. First, seasons are not independent of each other. A team that wins 100 games this year is, more than likely, going to have a better than average shot at winning the championship next year. I don't know what's going to happen in 2098 -- I have no particular belief about who's going to win the World Series 100 years from now. However, if you tell me that team X were champs in year N-1 (2097), they are going to be more likely to win in year N (2098). Strong teams tend to stay strong from year to year -- teams improve and decline fairly slowly. As you look over a shorter and shorter time frame, the averages are going to get more and more skewed because certain teams will be systematically stronger for much of that time span. The assumption of independence breaks down. Even in the past 25 years, where you'd expect perhaps 1 repeat champion, we've seen many more than that -- the 72-74 A's (two repeats), the 75-76 Reds, the 77-78 Yankees, and the 92-93 Blue Jays. It looks even worse if you look at repeats for league or division champions (such as the Atlanta Braves), since upsets are much more likely in a short series than over an entire season.

The second problem is the assumption of equal strength of teams in the long run. As has been noted, the dominance of the Yankees in the middle of this century can be attributed in large part to their self-reinforcing recruiting strength (the Yankees winning makes it easier to sign talent, which in turns makes them more likely to win), their financial resources (also related to their winning), systematically poor management of other teams (including the Red Sox of the 20's), and the lack of a draft to help ensure competitive balance. Over the last 30 years, many of those advantages have been lessened, though many would still argue that large market teams have an advantage over small market teams because they can afford to sign expensive free agents and "buy a championship".

My personal perspective on competitiveness is that baseball teams inhabit their own roles in a "competitive ecology". Within these roles or niches, teams can execute many different strategies and still be successful. Some teams will rely upon developing their own talent, pouring effort and resources into a farm system, and producing top-quality talent that they can retain for a few years at less than market rates (the Expos are the classic 90's example of this). Other teams will prefer to wait for talent to be proven, and then use their resources to acquire it, paying more than if they developed the talent themselves, but without the associated risks of "unproven" players (the Steinbrenner-era Yankees). What's necessary for this to work in the long-run is an environment where both strategies *can* be successful, but are not *guaranteed* to be successful.

The current six-year restriction on free-agency helps teams that develop their own talent retain it as less than market rates. Montreal has let some of its players go as they reached or approached free-agency in favor of younger, cheaper talent. A smart GM can also sign talent that has not fully blossomed to long-term contracts while they are still undervalued -- Cleveland did an excellent job of this with Manny Ramirez and many other of its good young players. On the other side of things, premiere free agents are often at their peak when they first come onto the market (age 27-29), but are seeking a lucrative multi-year contract. A long-term contract would make the signing team pay for that player's declining years, often paying a premium for the privilege of having retained their services at an earlier age. This is not necessarily a bad decision for the team, depending on its time, risk, and financial preferences. In the later years of the contract, however, this will tie up a spending team's currently available resources in a less than optimal way (e.g. the '98 Orioles may be a good example of this), helping prevent a long-term domination by a rich club.

Of course, a mixed strategy can be the best of all -- as witnessed by the Braves, developing excellent talent in house, along with a few key acquisitions that they are willing to pay market rates for. Other strategies can take advantage of incomplete information in the market -- paying market rates for players who's value is devalued by the buyers (teams). This is what Dan Duquette of the Boston Red Sox has done extremely well over the past several years -- recognizing and acquiring talent that is priced below what value they can contribute to a ballclub. He's a "scavenger", to stick with the ecological niche theme, finding real value in what others have discarded.

The optimal strategy for any specific team depends on its current composition, its financial resources, the state of its farm system, the quality of decision makers, the long-term financial commitments it has already made, and the state of the competition (either in the division or league). More importantly, though, it depends on how the owner and/or GM makes the tradeoff between its two dimensions of value -- winning and money. At some point, the decision-maker has to ask the questions "How much is a win worth?" or "What's the value of a championship?" These can be partially answered using marginal revenues, the financial appreciation in value of the franchise, effect on television contract revenue, and less tangible aspects like the owner's ego, his/her willingness to lose some money on the team, goodwill in the community, personal pride, a burning desire to get that call from the President on national TV, a determination to win the WS before he or she dies, etc. All of these can, and do affect what an owner is willing to pay for a team of a certain quality, and thus affect what decisions his agent (the GM) is willing to make to build the best team possible.

If we could guarantee that the Sox would win the World Series in 1998, but it would take a $250 million payroll, do you think John Harrington would go for it? If so, how about a $500 million payroll? At some point, like it or not, it is about more than winning -- the money is a factor. To make rational decision, you have to think about how you're willing to trade off between wins and dollars.

Revenue sharing, incidentally, helps level the field in one respect, in that the owners will be a little closer to each other in baseball-derived resources to fund a team with. It does not, however, address individual owners' tradeoff rates between wins and dollars, or any of the other issues involved in what a player is worth to an owner.

Back to the issue about teams dominating: A key question as to whether the current arrangement (or any other) is broken or not comes in how you answer two conflicting questions:

(1) How long should a team have to rebuild to be successful, assuming good decision-making, and average luck?
versus
[2) How easy should it be for a successful team to retain the core of its talent, and for how many years?
Generally, the dilemma can be stated as:
[3) How much success is enough to keep a team viable, and how much single team dominance hurts the marketability of the entire sport?

Note that these are goals not of an individual team, but of the sport as a whole. You have to assume that teams will make individual decision in what they perceive as their own best interest. These questions concern the competitive environment in which they make those decisions, to ensure the long-term viability of the baseball product as a whole, rather than that of a single franchise. As such, these are issues that the owners as a group need to address, perhaps with a commissioner or other governing body that oversees the game.

The first two goals contradict each other to a certain degree -- a team that wants to be successful for many years (a "dynasty") means that its difficult for a bad team to emerge as a top contender quickly (a "rebuilder"). Should it be darn-near impossible to repeat as champion? If so, you should design a system in which a successful team has trouble retaining or acquiring talent at its peak. Should the Expos have been able to hold onto their core of talent for a few years? How can you incent them to do so without risk of creating dynasties? Would a repeat of a 1950/Yankees era of domination hurt baseball's viability in every other market than the lucky one? Will a team's fan base stick with a team through a few lean years to see it rebuild, or are they so fickle that fielding anything less than a competitive team every season would drive it to financial ruin?

These aren't easy questions to answer -- and I'm not sure that the current powers-that-be are well equipped to answer them. They may not even be all that inclined to try to solve them. But I hope I have done a little bit to help illuminate the issues, so that they can be kept in mind the next time we read the sports section.

Keith Woolner runs a Red Sox mailing list from San Jose, California. This article, and many of his other writings about baseball, are available on the World Wide Web at www.stathead.com.

Is Arbitration Getting a Bum Rap? by **Bill Gilbert**

Every year about this time, articles appear on the sports pages headlining the size of raises players received in arbitration. The implication is that the arbitration process is responsible for unjustified salary increases which wouldn't otherwise occur. The stories do not address what the alternative might be.

Players with three, four and five years of major league service along with the most senior 17 % of two year players are eligible to file for salary arbitration. Those with lesser service are under control of the Clubs and can be paid whatever the Clubs want to pay them. Those with 6 or more years of service are eligible for free agency if they are not bound by a multi-year contract.

Without arbitration, there are other alternatives for determining compensation for the players who are currently eligible. One would be for the Clubs to retain control over the salaries until the players are eligible for free agency after six years. Another would be to provide automatic increases based on service time. I can't imagine what the Players Association would demand in exchange for a change to one of these plans so I think they can be safely ruled out.

The other alternative would be to grant free agency at the point where players are currently eligible for arbitration. The owners, in their infinite wisdom, floated a proposal along these lines during the last bargaining period. We have some evidence on how this would work. This is what they are doing now in the NBA. The rookies who signed three years ago will become free agents at the end of the current season. Let's look at what has happened to this class. Of the 13 lottery picks, 11 have been traded, some more than once, one is out of the NBA and only three are still with the teams that originally drafted them.

The Minnesota Timberwolves are one of the teams that still has their original draft choice, Kevin Garnett. To retain him, Minnesota signed him to contract in excess of $120 million that dwarfs anything that has ever been offered in baseball, and this to a player who wouldn't even be eligible yet for arbitration if he were in baseball. This is also in a league with a salary cap, another discredited idea, that the baseball owners tried to implement the last time around.

Is this what we want in baseball? I don't think so. Let's take a closer look at the results of arbitration. The process was devised to allow a player to have his salary influenced by his value in an open market, while still being retained by his team. It is designed to promote a settlement, usually somewhere near the midpoint of the Player's filing and the Club's filing. Of the 81 players who filed for free agency this year, 21 signed before figures were exchanged and another 52 settled prior to a scheduled hearing. Thus, only 8 players, less than 10 % of those who filed actually went to a hearing.

The process works. The vast majority reached a settlement, acceptable to both sides. The 8 players who were unable to reach an agreement had their cases heard in an arbitration hearing with the Clubs winning five and the Players winning three.

An obvious benefit of the process as opposed to free agency after 3 years is that it allows a "small market" team that has done a good job in finding and developing players to have a chance to be competitive for a year or two before the players flee to the "big market" teams.

Many would argue that salaries in baseball and other sports are out of control with the big market teams gradually driving the small market teams out of the picture. The arbitration process is one of the few things remaining that provides an element of order and stability.

Long-Term Holdouts

The annual rosters published in *The Sports Encyclopedia: Baseball* identify the cause of all career-ending injuries, and all career interruptions of 30 days or more. One of the codes used by this invaluable reference book is "HO," for "holdout." In the era before free agency, the following players held out for at least a month of the season; asterisks denote players who held out for the entire season.

1905: Jimmy Wiggs, Detroit
1906: Ed Abbaticchio*, Boston NL; Chick Fraser, Cincinnati; John Ganzel*, New York AL; Earl Moore, Cleveland
1907: Mike Donlin, New York NL; Jack Harper, Chicago NL
1909: Mike Donlin*, New York; Johnny Kling, Chicago NL; Bob Spade, Cincinnati
1910: Lew Brockett*, New York AL
1913: Elmer Knetzer*, Brooklyn
1915: Home Run Baker*, Philadelphia AL
1916: Joe Wood*, Boston AL
1918: Joe Jackson, Chicago AL; Dick Rudolph, Boston NL
1920" Chick Gandil*, Chicago AL (largely a pretext)
1921: Heinie Groh, Cincinnait
1922: Dickie Kerr, Chicago AL; Edd Roush, Cincinnati; Walter Schmidt, Pittsburgh; Fred Toney, New York NL
1924: Charlie Hollocher, Chicago NL

1927: Hughie Critz, Cincinnati
1928: Vic Aldrige, New York NL
1929: Ted Blankenship, Chicago AL
1930: Willie Kamm, Chicago AL; Chet Nichols, Philadelphia NL
1937: Red Ruffing, New York AL
1943: Lou Novikoff, Chicago NL
1945: Rufe Gentry*, Detroit
1950: Dick Wakefield, Chicago AL
1970: Curt Flood*, Philadelphia NL (held out to challenge reserve clause)
1971: Joe Azcue*, California
1972: Vida Blue, Oakland

Roster Changes

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