

**EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION,  
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND CHARISMA**

by

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## DEDICATION

*To those who are willing to reject the status quo ...*

Personality is part of the package too. Sure, an O'Malley is going to get all the cooperation from the other owners and the Commissioner while I'm always going to be wrestling single-handed. I'm a maverick. I'm a maverick the way O'Malley is a politician, by nature and by inclination. You cannot set yourself against the status quo and expect that the status quo isn't going to fight back. ... The status quo, by definition, wins almost every battle; otherwise it ain't the status quo any more. So you pick yourself up, dig the dirt out of your ears and try again.

-Bill Veeck

Feelings of limitless horizons opening up to the vision, the feeling of being simultaneously more powerful and also more helpless than one ever was before, the feeling of great ecstasy and wonder and awe, the loss of placing in time and space with, finally, the conviction that something extremely important and valuable had happened, so that the subject is to some extent transformed and strengthened even in his daily life by such experiences.

-Abraham Maslow

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Executive Succession, Organizational Performance, and Charisma

Recent events have reinvigorated interest in top leadership within organizations. Examples include (a) enduring innovations and successes by Michael Dell at Dell Computer Corporation (Gomes, 2002), (b) Carly Fiorina's initial problems at HP followed by her recovery and nomination as the Fortune Magazine 2002 Most Powerful Woman in Business (Sellers, 2000), (c) the bid for a "no confidence" vote, and then eventual removal of the Chairman title from Disney CEO Michael Eisner (Orwall & Grant, 2004), (d) the reported ethical violations at Enron that occurred with top management's implicit knowledge (McLean, 2001), (e) the charges, including enterprise corruption, against Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski (Byrnes, 2003), and (f) Martha Stewart's building of an empire followed by an investigation and indictment for insider trading (Scannell & Cohen, 2003) resolved through a conviction and sentencing for obstructing justice and lying to investigators (Naughton, 2004). According to Chemers (1997), popular press publications also have drifted towards a niche focused on top-level leaders (e.g. Bennis & Nanus, 1985; Kouzes & Posner, 1987; Tichy & Devanna, 1986). Recent popular press publications (e.g. Benton, 2003; Byron, 2004; Dotlich & Cairo, 2003; Gaines-Ross, 2002; Lencioni, 1998; Taranto, Leo, & Bennett, 2004; Waine, 2003) support this emerging trend. Increased interest likely has been driven, in part, because top-level leaders are the leaders who can influence

large-scale organizational change, and organizational change has become a hot topic in the organization development field (e.g. Axelrod, 2003; Kotter & Cohen, 2002).

Interest in top leadership is not new, as evidenced by (among others) the story of Gilgamesh, thought by some to be the oldest written story (George, 2003). Gilgamesh centers on the adventures of the Babylonian King of Uruk, who lived circa 2750 BCE. Also, Egyptian hieroglyphics had symbols that represented the word “leader” and the word “leadership” (Bass, 1990). Less ancient, but still historical is Carlisle’s (1841/1904/1966) statement that “The history of what man has accomplished in this world ... is the history of great men who have worked here” (p. 1). Despite the ongoing general interest in top leadership, a maintained interest in top leadership *research* has proven elusive.

The purpose of the current study of leadership was to determine if charismatic executive successors are more likely to be associated with changes in organizational performance than are noncharismatic executive successors. The following text reviews the roles of top leaders, and the research related to top leadership. Specific attention is given to the phenomenon of executive succession. Additionally, a theoretical mechanism for the effects of executive succession on organizational performance is presented, and a study is undertaken, using a nontraditional setting, to test the proposed effects.

### Roles of the Top Leader

Common sense suggests that a top leader can and does make a difference in the vital criteria (e.g. profitability) of an organization. The very fabric of the top leadership job family implies this essential relationship. Roles of a top leader, as defined through job analysis completed by the Occupational Information Network (O\*Net, 2003), are summarized in Appendix A and Appendix B. Referring to the O\*Net Chief Executive occupation report, the Chief Executive job exists in order to have an individual who is responsible for determining and formulating policies and business strategies, and providing overall direction to organizations. The aforementioned purpose indicates that it is the Chief Executive who guides the entire organization towards a particular set of goals. Indeed, this role is consistent with Senge's (1990) argument that one of the foremost roles of a leader is that of designer, and the sweeping influence encompassed within this role. According to Senge, "the functions of design ... are rarely visible. They take place behind the scenes. The consequences that appear today are the result of work done long in the past, and work today will show its benefits far in the future" (p.10). Clearly, the influence of the top leader, or designer, cascades throughout the organization, and is lagged in its effects.

The top leader accomplishes his or her job by conferring with others, analyzing operations, reviewing financial reports and directing financial activity, assigning and delegating responsibilities to subordinates, and directing departments within the organization. Several of these tasks are consistent with extant leadership theories meant to explain how a leader influences others. For



example, conferring with others is an attempt to gather needed information in order to develop the proper goals for the organization. This task is consistent with Hollander's (1958, 1964) social exchange theory of leadership. According to Hollander, the leader's function is to provide vision, direction, and recognition. Responsively, the followers legitimize the leader's influence.

Sherif and Sherif (1969) related the task of assigning and delegating responsibilities to status. They suggested that assignment of authority is needed to define responsibilities within the organizational hierarchy in order to organize and direct work in a manner consistent with the vision and goals of the organization. The examples of Hollander (1958, 1964) and Sherif and Sherif help demonstrate just two of the methods top leaders may use to exert influence over their respective organizations. The O\*Net job analysis is but one of several models of executive roles.

Mintzberg (1974, 1975) analyzed five CEOs and identified ten roles of executive leadership. Specifically Mintzberg noted three distinct role categories within an executive's job including (a) interpersonal roles, (b) informational roles, and (c) decisional roles. Mintzberg proposed holistic functioning with all roles simultaneously activated.

Hart and Quinn (1993) provided a third perspective on executive roles. They offered a theoretical integration of several already existing implicit and explicit models (i.e. Drucker, 1973; Mintzberg, 1975; Katz, 1974; Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983). Hart and Quinn's model has four quadrants, each representing a

domain of action. The four domains include innovation, commitment, efficiency and performance. These four domains are based on the competing values framework (Quinn, 1981; Quinn & Cameron, 1988) developed to study managerial leadership and organizational effectiveness. In the competing values framework, each axis has two competing values. For example, managers are faced with the competing values of spontaneity/flexibility and structure/predictability. Managers also face the challenge of balancing an internal focus and an external focus.

Hart and Quinn (1993) argued that these values are an influence at the executive level. The axes form quadrants, and these quadrants represent the roles of executives as purported in previously existing models. The four emergent role categories include (a) vision setter, (b) motivator, (c) analyzer, and (d) task master. As an example, the vision setter role relates to creating a sense of identity and mission. Because the executive is targeting innovation, a flexible and external focus are vital to the role. As a second example, the motivator role relates to the management of meaning. Executives are required to translate the vision into a “cause worth fighting for.” It is in this role that the executive can create excitement throughout the organization. Particular executives may have strong orientations towards particular role categories, suggesting that different executives may better match certain situations.

Stewart (1982) posed another consideration, one relating to the impact of executive decisions. Specifically, according to Stewart, demands, constraints,

and discretion define executive decisions. Demands refer to what the leader absolutely must do. Constraints refer to factors that limit what the leader can do. Discretion refers to opportunities for leaders in similar positions to do both different work, and the same work in ways different from their counterparts. Drawing from that logic, if the situation is relatively stable and standardized, as it might be for an assessment center, then the demands and constraints should be similar across leaders. Differences then can be more confidently attributed to discretion between leaders. Both orientation and decision definition may influence how an executive approaches his or her role, but some aspects of the role are predetermined.

#### Can Top Leaders Make a Difference?

Accepting that Gandhi, Walter Reuther, and George Washington affected their followers seems correct at a gut level (see respectively Fischer, 2002; Lichtenstein, 1997; Irving, 1856-1859/1994). Analysis of the top leader role also suggests that top leaders can make a difference in organizational effectiveness. However, there is a dearth of literature directly addressing this point, and perhaps because of the lacking literature, there is much debate as to whether or not top leaders can make a difference.

The history of leadership research may be partially to blame for the debate. Several leadership volumes (King, 1990; Chemers, 1997) trace the origin of leadership studies to Thomas Carlyle's (1841) series of lectures on great men. Carlyle focused on figures he considered to have driven great change

efforts like Odin, Martin Luther, and Shakespeare. Carlyle removed any questioning of his thesis, and removed the debate over top leaders making a difference, when he stated that “No sadder proof can be given by man of his own littleness than disbelief in great men” (p. 13). From this passionate case-study foundation, leadership studies moved forward by offering adjustments to “Great Man Theory.”

Thus, Gemmill and Oakley (1992), integrating other authors (Anthony, 1977; Gemmill, 1986; Neumann, 1989), opened their article on leadership and social myth by shining light on the faulty foundation of leadership research. Gemmill and Oakley asserted that cultural assumptions lead us to assume that the need for leaders is indisputable, but that this assumption is unfounded except for unconscious rationalization. These authors made an excellent point that the supporting research had not been completed to demonstrate the need for leadership. Belief in leadership was contingent on faith. Calder (1977) argued that, indeed, actual leadership was not an influence over organizational outcomes, but that, instead only the perception of leadership was influential. Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich (1985) conducted a series of studies on romanticized conceptions of leadership. The studies supported the idea that individuals tend to exaggerate the effects of leadership. Meindl (1990) went on to blast charismatic leadership as social contagion.

Counter to the above criticisms is the work of Day and Lord (1988). Their counter-argument was based solely on the executive succession and

organization effectiveness literature. The executive succession literature is frequently used as a source to determine leader effectiveness. This literature will be reviewed prior to a more in-depth examination of Day and Lord.

### Executive Succession and Organization Effectiveness

The literature on executive succession dates back to the beginnings of time. For example, even the story of the Noah's Ark is a case of executive succession (as well as drastic culture change). The Lord decides that the Earth is full of violence and corruption, and so the Lord appoints Noah to build an ark. Then the Lord floods the rest of humanity (Genesis 6).

Gouldner (1954a, 1954b) conducted a more formal investigation into leader succession. In reality, a study of bureaucracy, Gouldner assessed a poorly functioning gypsum plant, then observed the entrance of a new manager and the problems that he faced, and finally witnessed a leadership collapse via a wildcat strike (an unauthorized strike while a labor contract is still in effect). Guest (1962) found the direct opposite effect of succession. That is, a new manager in a plant setting led to an improvement in performance. Carlson (1962) noted that little had been done to conceptualize the field of executive succession. He suggested that because executive succession was so ubiquitous and commonly understood, it was unlikely to challenge scholars.

Grusky (1963) often receives credit as the significant contributor to executive succession research in the 1960s (Kesner & Sebor, 1994). Grusky systematically studied leader succession in sports. He completed seminal work

on baseball managerial changes ranging from 1921-1941 and also from 1951-1958. His interest focused on administrative succession and organizational effectiveness. He deemed that in the structure of baseball organizations the ultimate responsibility for team success or failure rested with the field manager. For organizational effectiveness, he relied solely on team standings, footnoting that from a logical view, profitability, attendance and effectiveness were all related. As support, he reported that a strong positive correlation between team standing and yearly attendance was found. The actual correlation statistic was never reported. Grusky found that teams with more total managerial successions, as measured over the two extended time periods, were less successful in the standings. While Grusky delivered a large set of alternative explanations for the findings, future scholars have mostly interpreted his work as suggesting that managerial change is disruptive and thus leads to further decline in performance.

Gamson and Scotch (1964) seriously questioned Grusky's work, and using data of managerial changes from 1954-1961, they suggested that "ritual scapegoating" was a better alternative for why managerial change fails to lead to improved organizational effectiveness. According to this theory, the change in managers is important because it reduces the anxiety associated with poor present performance despite having no actual influence over future performance. Other researchers have built from these initial studies by fine-tuning methodological issues (e.g. Allen, Panian, & Lotz, 1979; Brown, 1982; Fabianic,

1984, 1994; McTeer, White, & Persad, 1995). It is interesting to note that, though considered a crucial part of the executive succession literature, all of these studies focus on field managers. Most of the *executive* succession and organization effectiveness data emerged from Lieberman and O'Connor (1972) and Salancik and Pfeffer (1977).

Lieberman and O'Connor (1972) examined 167 corporations in 13 industries over the course of 20 years. The authors argued that organization leaders are restricted by the strong situations in which they are enveloped, and their study compared the influence on outcomes, of corporate and environmental factors versus leadership effects. Specifically, measured outcomes included sales, earnings, and profit margins. Effects of top leadership were balanced against effects of the state of the economy, the company's primary industry, and the company's position within the industry. Lieberman and O'Connor found that the majority of variance in sales, earnings, and profit margins were due to factors other than leadership. However, they also found effects of leadership on all three of the criteria, particularly when they lagged performance over three years. Lieberman and O'Connor provided no rationale for the time frame they chose. It is interesting to note that the conclusions from their work are often interpreted as support for the notion that "leadership makes no difference."

Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) also stressed organizational constraints as limitations to leader effectiveness. They researched the discretionary power that mayors have in city budgetary activities. Salancik and Pfeffer gathered

expenditure and income data between the years of 1951 and 1968 for 30 United States cities. Their results indicated that the city is the main variance source in expenditures. Again, it is interesting to note that support was found for mayoral discretion as an explanation for some variance, but this finding was not highlighted. The authors also elected not to examine moderators such as political party transition upon succession. Further, Salancik and Pfeffer warn against expectations of profound change when mayoral succession occurs.

#### Day and Lord's Critique

Day and Lord (1988) stepped back from the existing literature, and re-evaluated the data and methodologies of prior researchers. Regarding Lieberman and O'Connor (1972), Day and Lord argued that, prior to controlling for lag time and size of compounds, leadership can explain 7.5% of the variance in net income. For most organizations, 7.5% of variance relates to a large sum of money. In practical terms, if an organization had a net income of \$100,000,000, leadership would account for \$7,500,000. When the data are considered with a three-year lag and organizational size is controlled, leadership explains 32% of the profit margin! Day and Lord suggest that the findings of Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) also lend support to the importance of leadership. While city size explained the majority of variance, the mayoral discretion predictor explained 24% of the variance in the budget when the budget criteria are computed as proportions of the total city budget.



Day and Lord (1988) also raised methodological concerns with executive succession studies. For example, Day and Lord did not address the studies of Grusky (1963) and Gamson and Scotch (1964) by name, but do criticize the use of sports coach and manager succession studies as being inappropriate for drawing conclusions about leadership. Day and Lord argued that these studies are flawed by the use of an incorrect level of analysis. They stated that, "Coaches and managers are analogous to middle-level managers in business, rather than upper-level executives. Coaches and managers do not independently devise long-term strategy regarding personnel ... A study comparable to that of executive succession would involve changes in team ownership or in the general manager position" (p.457).

Yet another methodological criticism by Day and Lord (1988) is that leader ability is not considered. They speculated that not every change in leadership will result in improved performance, and examinations of all changes in leadership likely led to underestimates of leader effectiveness in prior studies. Thus, it would increase the measured effects of leadership if there were an accurate mechanism for distinguishing effective leaders from ineffective leaders.

#### Executive Succession Studies Supporting Leadership Effectiveness

Two other executive succession studies, cited by Day and Lord (1988), lend support to leader influence on organization effectiveness. Weiner and Mahoney (1981), concerned about the methods of Lieberman and O'Connor (1972), performed a partial replication. Weiner and Mahoney randomly selected

193 manufacturing companies from the Compustat Industrial File. In their model of corporate performance, the authors examined as their outcome criteria corporate performance measures such as profit level, profitability, and stock prices. Predictors included environmental factors (e.g. GNP, sales, concentration), organizational factors (e.g. corporate size, corporate technology), and leadership (e.g. capital structure strategy, retained earnings strategy, and stewardship). Additionally, Weiner and Mahoney used simultaneous regression as opposed to Lieberman and O'Connor who employed sequential regression where leadership predictors were entered last. Finally, Weiner and Mahoney lagged the stewardship predictor for both two and five years. Similar to the prior research, Weiner and Mahoney found that corporate size was the largest explanatory predictor for profit. In other words, larger corporations earn larger profits than smaller corporations. However, stewardship accounted for 40% of the variance not explained by other predictors. Lagging stewardship had no impact at the two-year mark, but did have a slight impact at the five-year mark. Weiner and Mahoney cautioned that some measures might be more susceptible to long-run effects than others. It is notable that, similar to other research, Weiner and Mahoney did not distinguish between leader ability.

Smith, Carson, and Alexander (1984) differentiated leader ability in their study of Methodist ministers from 1961-1980. Smith et al. hypothesized that effective leaders do make a difference. Creative outcome criteria of objective congregation performance included attendance, membership, property value,

general assembly giving, total giving, and United Methodist Women (UMW) giving. The researchers included the UMW predictor because they argued that the minister has little direct influence over UMW, and so it could serve as a control. Smith et al. identified effective leaders by salary because, for ministers, each congregation determined salary. Succession effects were tested because ministers were required to rotate among congregations every few years. Smith et al. found support for the notion that superior leaders, as determined by salary, have positive effects on performance, but that those effects cannot be distinguished without differentiation of superior and non-superior ministers. Superior ministers also had positive effects when they rotated from one congregation to the next.

The research conducted by Smith et al. (1984) is commendable for the efforts to include a nontraditional setting, for interesting conceptualization of organizational effectiveness criteria, for unintentionally or indirectly controlling for organizational size, and for acknowledging that leader ability makes a difference. However, several limitations are readily apparent. First, the use of salary as the predictor that distinguishes effective from ineffective leaders is questionable. A logical alternative is that those ministers who are at better performing congregations achieve higher salaries. In fact, there is a highly structured and set career path for United Methodist ministers that might confound the Smith et al. study. United Methodist ministry uses an appointive system, where ministers are assigned where needed, regardless of achievement. The conclusion that the

minister led to the success of the church because of his or her ability is overstated.<sup>1</sup>

Second, the study is arguably a study of management rather than leadership. Methodist ministers may not really be equivalent to executives. Different roles may apply to Methodist ministers than those that apply to executives. As a reminder, the main purpose of the Chief Executive job is to formulate policies and to determine the overall direction of an organization. Depending on the denomination, the roles of the clergy, and how those roles are prioritized will vary. Further, because ministers and executives likely differ in competitiveness, the industry environment and context are also likely to be different. Ultimately, these are issues of content and construct validity.

A third limitation, one suggested by Smith et al. (1984), is that the reason why some ministers are superior is unknown. In fact, the question of why leaders make a difference in succession is not well addressed by any studies. There is no rationale for how leaders behave differently in order to achieve higher salaries. Until theory and support is researched, the question of why some leaders are superior in executive succession will remain unanswered, and the goals of prediction and understanding cannot be met.

#### The Effective Leader Mechanism

Hall (1977) argued that leadership is important in times of growth, change, and crisis but that leadership is less relevant at other times (e.g. times of stability). Kerr and Jermier (1978) suggested that the leader is complementary,

and provides direction and support that is missing from the environment. According to Kerr and Jermier, where the environment already provides resources, the leader is unnecessary. Even so, a time of crisis and change is a defining situation for when a leader is needed. Besides, underlying the statements of Hall and Kerr and Jermier, is the mixing of management and leadership. Referring once again to job analysis, it is the leader's purpose to formulate policies and direct the organization. This distinction is consistent with attempts by some researchers to separate management from leadership.

For example, Katz and Kahn (1978) distinguished between different levels of leadership, and their associated roles. Middle-level leaders are concerned with translating policy into structure, while top-level leaders are concerned about formulating policy. Zaleznik and Kets de Vries (1975) refer to maximum men versus minimum men, and separate these men by their influence on followers. Maximum men draw followers through conviction and vision, and evoke mystical reactions, partly due to their social distance. Minimum men are concerned about equality of transactions with followers, and are concerned about opinions of themselves. The maximum man formulates policy, and the minimum man follows it. Conger and Kanungo (1998) built from these distinctions, and defined managers as administrators and supervisors. According to Conger and Kanungo, "the essential characteristics of leadership become (1) challenging the status quo, (2) engaging in creative visioning for the future of the organization, and (3) promoting appropriate changes in followers' values, attitudes, and

behaviors by using empowering strategies and tactics” (p. 8). Conger and Kanungo refer to leader behaviors that are consistent with the outcomes of charisma. Charismatic leadership theories and related theories (e.g. visionary, transformational) offer an explanation for why some leaders are effective and can handle crises and drive change, and why other leaders are less effective.

### Charisma

Weber (1947), pulling from the foundations of Christian religious leaders like Rudolph Sohm, referred to charisma as a quality within an individual's personality that sets the person apart from ordinary men and women, leading to the individual being treated as having a supernatural, superhuman type of power. The charismatic leader was not bound by the rational, and was able to discard the past and serve as a drastic force of change (Chemers, 1997). Weber was not concerned as to whether or not charisma actually existed within the individual. Instead, he focused on attributing the phenomenon to the reactions of followers. Weber (1919/1958, 1947) maintained that charismatic revolutions could not emerge from within existing institution arrangements. Instead, the charismatic leader had to arrive from the margins of society. For Weber, the core role of charismatic leadership was to create a paradigm shift, and embed a new social order. Charismatic leaders were associated with innovation, progress, and transformation. Accordingly, profound effects were likely to occur when the early stages of charismatic leadership are compared to the fading stages of the previous leadership.

The organizational life cycle concept (Kimberly & Miles, 1980) exemplifies this phenomenon. The organizational life cycle model suggests that organizations face rites of passage encompassing birth, growth, and death. Unadaptive responses may develop as the organization ages. Generally, four stages are suggested by research (Hunt, Baliga, & Peterson, 1988; see also Adizes, 1979; Kimberly & Quinn, 1984; Quinn & Cameron, 1983; Schein, 1992; Tichy, 1983) including birth, growth, maturity, and revitalization or death. Hunt, Baliga, and Peterson stated that the key demands for revitalization via a crisis path include communicating a crisis plan, creating/communicating a new organizational vision, and laying a new culture base. Charismatic leadership is a natural fit for crisis situations in organizations because of the need for new vision and culture change. A brief review of various charismatic leadership theories follows.

House (1977) made explicit the behavioral and personality characteristics that distinguish charismatic leaders from noncharismatic leaders. House proposed that charismatic leaders are different because they have extremely high levels of self-confidence, need to dominate others, hold a strong conviction in the moral righteousness of their beliefs, and have a high need to influence others. Charismatic leaders reportedly engage in six behaviors including role modeling, image building, goal articulation, high expectations, confidence, and motive arousal behaviors. House also offered two situational determinants that encourage charisma. Followers are more susceptible to charisma in stressful

situations, and charisma is fostered if the situation provides the opportunity to express goals in ideological terms.

Katz and Kahn (1978) formulated only a partial theory of charismatic leadership, but their work is worth noting. Somewhat opposed to traditional leadership theory, they suggested that social distance was a key factor for charismatic leadership in organizations. According to Katz and Kahn top leaders are far enough removed from most followers to allow for the perception of a simplified and magical image. Katz and Kahn also suggested that charismatic leaders influence others based on their ability to articulate or construct an emotionally meaningful vision or mission, and that this was the defining factor of charisma.

Transformational leadership is based on the work of Burns (1978). A political scientist, Burns reviewed the lives of several profound leaders (similar to the work of Carlisle more than 100 years earlier). Burns (1978) argued that there are two forms of leadership and defined these types as transactional and transforming. Transactional leadership is based on the exchange of benefits, and is guided by self-interest. Transformational leadership involved influencing followers to become leaders, with the resulting effect being that former followers become the agents of change. Followers are driven by commitment to a higher moral responsibility rather than on self-interest.

Bass (1985) attempted to apply Burns' work to organizations. Bass found three leadership factors that explained why subordinates described managers as



transformational. The first factor, charisma, explained 66% of the variance. Later work (Bass & Avolio, 1993) separated this main factor into two factors, charisma and inspirational motivation. The remaining transformational factors were intellectual stimulation and individualized consideration. Most of the work by Bass and colleagues, in an attempt to bring the scope of leadership out beyond the elite levels of organizations, focused on managers, and thus implied that managers and leaders are equivalent. From an executive succession perspective, perhaps this merger was a step in the wrong direction.

Conger and Kanungo (1987) provided a behavioral model of charismatic leadership with charisma as an attribution made by followers, a similar argument to the one made by Weber (1947). Conger and Kanungo suggested that attributions of charisma depend on the (a) degree of discrepancy between the status quo and the future goal or vision advocated by the leader, (b) use of innovative and unconventional means for achieving the desired change, (c) leader's success in assessing the environmental resources and constraints for effecting the change, and (d) type of articulation and impression management used by the leader to inspire subordinates in the pursuit of the vision. Because their theory was behavioral, Conger and Kanungo (1988) also proposed that charismatic leadership attributions occur in stages. In the first stage, the charismatic leader evaluates the status quo and, for the most part, opposes it and wants to change it. In the second stage, the charismatic leader formulates a vision that is opposed to the status quo, and articulates this vision. Finally, in the

third stage, the charismatic leader enacts the means to achieve the vision. These means often will include unconventional or counter normative methods, and the charismatic leader will pursue these means as a passionate advocate.

From the reviewed literature, it is obvious that several overlapping and complementary, yet variant views of charismatic leadership existed. For example, the idea that a charismatic leader will be associated with innovation and change is an implication of all of the theories. However, propositions regarding charismatic leader personality characteristics are less consistent across the theories. A theory was needed to mesh the existing theories.

#### Self-concept Theory of Transformational and Charismatic Leadership

Shamir, House, and Arthur (1993) searched for an underlying mechanism for charismatic, visionary, and transformational leadership theories. They found high levels of convergence among the existing empirical studies indicating that hypothesized charismatic leader behaviors lead to hypothesized charismatic follower effects. Charismatic leader behaviors, as compared to other types of leader behaviors, also tended explain more variance in follower behaviors related to satisfaction and performance.

Shamir et al. (1993) theorized that charismatic leadership motivates followers by activating follower self-concepts. Figure 1 presents their full model. Self-concepts, our answer to the question “Who are you?”, have long been studied by psychologists (see Higgins, 1987; Markus & Wurf, 1987; Suls & Greenwald, 1986). According to Shamir et al., behavior is not only instrumental,

but also self-expressing. Behaviors help us to affirm our identities. Further, individuals are motivated to maintain and enhance self-esteem and self-worth. Self-esteem and self-worth stem from factors that are internalized in the self-concept. Individuals gain much of their feedback related to self-esteem and self-worth from others (James, 1890; Cooley, 1902). Individuals then use that feedback to engage in self-evaluation, a source of intrinsic motivation.

Shamir et al. (1993) also argued that individuals are interested in maintaining self-consistency. Self-consistency is the notion of correspondence of the self-concept at a given time to the self-concept over time, and also to the correspondence between the self-concept and behavior (Turner, 1968). Self-consistency provides meaning to individuals. Additionally, Shamir et al. suggest that self-concepts are a conglomeration of identities. Social identities place individuals into recognizable categories, allowing others to derive meaning from the categories (Ashforth & Mael, 1989). Finally, Shamir et al. proposed that individuals are motivated by faith. Even when expectancies are subjectively low, faith in the better future is intrinsically satisfying.

Referring to the model, Shamir et al. (1993) related the behaviors associated with charismatic leadership to follower outcomes. They suggested that the more a leader engages in charismatic behavior, the more likely he or she is to influence the follower's self-concept. Implicitly, activated self-concepts lead to higher motivation, and higher motivation leads to higher performance.

#### Charismatic Leadership and Executive Succession

Relating back to the executive succession studies, I presume that effective top leadership successors are charismatic, and activate follower self-concepts, thus increasing motivation and performance. It is also important to consider that some of the aforementioned theories imply that charisma exists at all levels of an organization and may involve direct interpersonal relations between leaders and subordinates (e.g. Bass, 1985). However, some of the original conceptions of charisma viewed it only as a distal process (e.g. Weber, 1947). In fact, charismatic theorists have gravitated so much towards managerial interaction that Yammarino (1994) pleaded that charisma should also be considered as applicable to leadership at a distance.

Shamir (1995) advocated that there are differences between close and distant charismatic leaders. The focus for the distant leader, as opposed to the close leader, according to Shamir, is that distant leaders are more focused on ideology, vision, rhetoric, and prior organizational performance. To investigate differences between close and distant charismatic leadership, Shamir asked 320 Israeli students to identify a charismatic leader whom they had a direct relationship with, and a charismatic leader whom with they did not have a direct relationship. Shamir found that distant leaders were more likely than close leaders to (a) possess an ideological orientation, (b) possess rhetorical skills, (c) exhibit persistence and perseverance behaviors related to their vision, (d) show courage, and (e) be non-conformists. Followers, then, were more likely to have blind trust and an idealized image of distant leaders.

Shamir (1995) also found some categories that were relevant to both distant and close leaders. All charismatic leaders were defined by (a) self-confidence, (b) dominance, (c) symbolic role modeling, and (d) honesty. Followers perceived all charismatic leaders as influencing group cohesion and collective identity, and followers had an admiration for all charismatic leaders. What the research completed by Shamir also suggests is that factors like consideration, expertise, and non-symbolic role modeling will be less relevant to distant leaders. Further, followers, in relation to distant leaders, are less likely to (a) have positive affect, (b) identify with that leader, (c) emulate that leader, and (d) experience effects on their self-efficacy.

Waldman and Yammarino (1999) proffered a model of CEO charismatic leadership that integrates levels issues and accounts for differences between close and distant leadership. Figure 2 displays their full model. Of most interest to the current text, Waldman and Yammarino proposed that charismatic attributions towards the CEO would be influenced by organizational performance and by CEO symbolic behaviors, vision, sagas, and storytelling. The implication is that distant leaders have less opportunity to form the type of relationships that close leaders do, and so charisma may be defined differently. Waldman and Yammarino also indicated that charismatic attributions towards the CEO would result in heightened intragroup and intergroup cohesion and effort, and that if perceived environmental volatility exists, then these outcomes will increase even

more. Perceived volatility is defined as organizational members' perceptions of the rate and range of change in various environmental sectors (Tosi, 1992).

Waldman, Ramirez, House, and Puranam (2001) investigated the charisma and perceived volatility issue further, suggesting that CEO attributes and performance depend on perceived environmental uncertainty. Focusing on senior managers who had direct contact with CEOs, the researchers surveyed 210 managers from 131 firms, only a 20% response rate. The findings supported the argument that charismatic leadership may affect firm performance only in conditions of perceived environmental uncertainty.

What is apparent from models and work on distant charismatic leadership is that (a) distant charismatic leadership is based on a perception or attribution, (b) distant charismatic leaders likely have psychological effects on followers, and (c) distant charismatic leadership may have a larger effect in situations of perceived environmental volatility. The study of higher level or distant leaders has nuances when compared to the study of close leaders, and needs different considerations in design. Of course, gathering useful data on distant executives can be a challenge.

#### Distant Charismatic Executive Succession and Proposed Theoretical Constructs

From the literature discussed above, pertaining to executive succession and distant charismatic leadership, it is implied that the introduction of a charismatic executive successor to a top leadership position will predict changes to specific organizational criteria, and that these changes may not result when

the executive successor is noncharismatic. The organizational criteria of interest are currently summarized as described in the aforementioned literature review. Based on the summaries, hypotheses are presented. As a cautionary note, it should be understood that all of these constructs are generalized, and that much of the executive succession research literature has focused on the constructs, as measured in traditional organizational settings. However, the current research examined the same constructs in a nontraditional setting, that is, Major League Baseball (MLB) sports organizations. Thus, the hypotheses are specified according to equivalent measures of performance.

#### Internal Organizational Performance

The sustenance of the executive succession research literature has been the relationship between executive succession and organizational performance (Kesner & Sebor, 1994). Much of the research attempted to draw conclusions regarding criteria that included profit level, profitability, net income, and sales (e.g. Lieberman & O'Connor, 1972; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). All of these measures relate to the internal organization, meaning that these are areas of the internal environment that a leader can influence. As Day and Lord (1988) suggest, most studies do indicate that executive succession influences internal performance, and separation of effective versus ineffective executive successors makes the difference more profound.

Day and Lord (1988) also provide sample reasoning for why executive successors might have an influence over *all* types organizational performance.

In the category of internal influence and adaptation, they include the productivity target and the associated objective of an increase in organizational efficiency. Day and Lord propose tactics to achieve this objective that include the direct route of reducing capital or personnel costs, and the indirect route of strengthening productivity norms. General Motors is a prime example of a situation where an executive successor followed the direct route to increasing organizational efficiency. Winter and Corbett (2001) reported that Rick Wagoner became the CEO of General Motors (GM) in June 2000, and by December 2001 he had led the way to major changes. These changes included the replacement of many top managers, a reorganization of the methods used in design, product development and marketing, and the removal of unprofitable divisions. Within that same time period, according to Winter and Corbett, GM achieved major gains in productivity, quality, supplier relations, and market share.

The indirect route of strengthening productivity norms is best achieved through organizational culture change (Schein, 1985). Schein claimed that one of the critical aspects of organizational culture is the category of group norms, the implicit standards and values that evolve in working groups. He also claimed that charisma is one of the basic methods leaders use to embed their messages within the organization. One example of how a leader might use charisma to convey their message is found in the work of Shamir (1995).

Shamir (1995) suggested that distant charismatic leaders could often be defined by their rhetorical skills (e.g. "He was a gifted orator"; "Speaks to people



in a way that sounds very true”). According to Shamir, the perceptions of distant leaders rely more heavily on prototypes and simplifications (Gerstner & Day, 1994; Lord, 1985; Lord, Foti, & Phillips, 1982; Lord & Maher, 1991).

Shamir, Arthur, and House (1994) provided an example of rhetoric designed for a charismatic speech. These researchers based their work on the self-concept theory of charismatic leadership proposed by Shamir et al. (1993). In the self-concept theory of charismatic leadership, five processes for charismatic leaders to influence followers are proposed. The processes include (a) increasing the intrinsic value of effort expended in the pursuit of goals, (b) empowerment of followers by increasing self-efficacy and collective-efficacy perceptions, (c) increasing the intrinsic value of goal accomplishment, (d) instilling faith in a better future, and (e) increasing followers’ commitment. Shamir et al. (1994) proposed and demonstrated that speeches of charismatic leaders differed from speeches of noncharismatic leaders on seven fronts. The speeches of charismatic leaders had (a) more references to collective history and to the continuity between the past and present, (b) more references to the collective and to the collective identity, and fewer references to individual self-interest, (c) more positive references to followers’ worth and efficacy as individuals and as a collective, (d) more references to the leader’s similarity to followers and identification with followers, (e) more references to values and moral justification, and fewer references to tangible outcomes and instrumental justifications, (f) more references to distant goals and the distant future, and

fewer references to proximal goals and the near future, and (g) more references to hope and faith.

Shamir et al. (1994) content analyzed portions of speeches from the National Convention of the Democratic Party in 1988. Shamir et al. considered the speech of Jackson to exemplify a charismatic leader, and supported this contention based on the reaction of convention delegates and television viewers.

In Jackson's speech, he began by referencing history that linked a chain of heroes who had fought a similar struggle as the one he proposed to fight. For example, Jackson referenced the pioneering struggles of Martin Luther King. Jackson also attempted to create and emphasize a collective identity. His speech referred to "brotherhood", and used the metaphor of building a quilt from various scraps, with the end result being a powerful blanket that provided warmth. To achieve a reinforcement of collective efficacy, Jackson links history and collective efficacy. For example, he states that, "The only time we win is when we come together" and "When we do not come together, we never win." In order to demonstrate similarity between himself and those hearing his speech, Jackson stressed his childhood and how poor he was, and how he really was a "common man" (similar to those who he hoped to appeal to). Jackson referenced general moral justifications in his speech such as "It's right and it's fair." He also used phrases like "higher good". The attempt by Jackson to reference hope and faith focused on the use of the words like "hope", "faith", and

“dream”. He attempted to reference follower self-efficacy using phrases like “we must never surrender” and “don’t give up”.

These sorts of charismatic statements might lead to a perception by followers that the time for normative change has arrived. In fact, Greenblatt (1983) proposed that employee reactions to succession fall into dichotomous groups. The “Rebecca” group views the predecessor as irreplaceable, while the “Messiah” group views the successor as a savior. Research on implicit leadership also supports this claim. For example, Eden and Leviatan (1975) had participants fill out a survey after being given very little information about a production plant. From this minimal information, participants rated the leadership of the plant. Guided by their implicit expectations of a leader in charge of a successful or unsuccessful plant, the participants drew conclusions about the leader in the survey. For a distant charismatic executive successor, it is essential to influence followers so that they make attributions towards the executive successor that support the idea, as proposed by Weber (1947), that the executive successor has special powers of divine origin. The distant charismatic executive successor must convey to followers a need for change.

Wagoner and Jackson are just two examples of leaders who used change management tactics to influence internal productivity measures. Clearly, there is evidence to support the idea that distant charismatic executive succession can lead to increases in productivity. Even so, the Wagoner example, derived from an article written 18 months after his promotion to CEO, highlights the

importance of lag time when studying executive succession. As for Jackson, he failed to obtain the 1988 presidential nomination, but over time, built an even greater following.

### Lag Time

While a change in executives may suggest an expected change in performance, it may take time. For example, both Jack Welch and Lee Iacocca needed time before affecting their organizations. As reported by Kesner and Sebra (1994), some researchers have suggested that executive succession actually may involve stages, with advanced changes taking place only after a power securing stage (Gabarro, 1986; Gilmore & McCann, 1983; Kelly, 1980). In the major studies of executive succession cited earlier, lag times of two years, and five years were used (Lieberson & O'Connor, 1972; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981), and other researchers promote examining a lag time of several years, depending on the context (Day & Lord, 1988).

Based on the above discussion, it is hypothesized that distant charismatic executive succession should be positively related to measures of change in internal organizational productivity, and further, these changes may only occur when considered with a lag time. In terms of equivalent measures involving distant charismatic executive successions in MLB and measures of internal organizational productivity:

H1A. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significant increase in team winning percentage in the year

following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H1B. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significant increase in team winning percentage at a two-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H1C. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significant increase in team winning percentage at a three-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

Rather than focusing solely on winning percentage, other performance outcomes should also be considered. The reason for this is that many baseball executives do not argue that their team has the goal of winning more games. Instead, baseball executives, the effective ones, argue that they want to win pennants and championships. The goal of the executive is to be the best in the business. Bill Veeck referring to his purchase of the Cleveland Indians and self-installation as president of the organization said, "Cleveland had been without a pennant for 26 years, the longest of any American League city, and we communicated our determination to produce one" (Veeck, 1962, p. 118). Of course, not all executives can be expected to be as interested in winning pennants and championships as Veeck was. As with winning percentage, pennants and championships may take time. The real interest is in change. That is, does an

executive successor lead a lower tier team to the pennant and championship?

Does an executive successor lead a higher tier team to a fall from grace?

H2A. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher likelihood of a pennant within three years following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H2B. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher likelihood of a World Series Championship within three years following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

The above hypotheses are measures of internal organizational performance. However, there is a related construct, also a measure of organizational performance, but more focused on the external organizational performance, and involves leader influence on consumers rather than organizational employees.

#### External Organizational Performance

Beyond measures such as sales and profits, there are other related measures that stem from a different set of perceptions. Often, executive succession research has only measured traditional accounting measures, and has avoided measuring performance as it relates to the external organization stakeholders (Kesner & Sebor, 1994). As a reaction to this bias, many researchers elected to look at different criteria, including stock market reaction. Beatty and Zajac (1987) argued that external stakeholders might view executive

succession as an indicator of the organization's future. In their study, a negative stock market reaction to executive succession was found. Other studies found a positive reaction (Davidson, Worrell, & Chang, 1990) or no significant effect (Bonnier & Bruner, 1989; Friedman & Singh, 1989; McGuire, Schneeweis, & Naroff, 1988; Reinganum, 1985; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988; Weisbach, 1988). However, when executive successions were divided by board-initiated changes versus other changes, results of research indicated a positive stock market reaction, especially when pre-succession performance was poor (Friedman & Singh, 1989; Furtado & Rozeff, 1987; Weisbach, 1988). One logical inference from these findings is that they support the notion that the identification of effective versus ineffective executive leaders is a critical component of executive succession research.

Day and Lord (1988) proposed indirect tactics for influencing the external environment including the creation of favorable public image and the enhancement of the image of an organization or product. Certainly the earlier discussion focused on charismatic rhetoric could play a role here. Just as leaders can try to influence the self-concepts of internal stakeholders, leaders can also try to influence the self-concepts of external stockholders. Several consumer behavior issues are relevant to this idea because individuals communicate meaning to others through the purchase and use of products (Blackwell, Miniard, & Engel, 2001). For example, Oliver (1999) offers that consumers blend their personal identities with the cultural milieu surrounding a

product when they wear a logo shirt. The top leader of the organization likely influences perceptions of the product, much the same way that he or she influences the organizational culture. It is also possible that charismatic leaders reduce the perceived risk of an external stakeholder. Perceived risk (Bauer, 1960) is the assessment that consumers make of the consequences of making a purchase mistake, and also the assessment of the likelihood of that mistake. Jacoby and Kaplan (1972) identified five types of perceived risk including physical, functional, social, psychological, and financial. Roselius (1971) added the concept of perceived time risk. Charismatic leaders may be able to reduce the perceived social risk associated with a product if they can convince consumers that a product is of high quality, or that consumption of the product does not lead to the consumer being perceived as unfashionable. From a logical standpoint, it makes sense that if a charismatic leader can influence a consumer's faith in a product, then the assessment of the likelihood of purchasing mistake is reduced. Financially, this means that more consumers may purchase a product. The potential correlation between criteria of external organizational performance and internal organizational performance should be noted. For example, if more consumers are convinced of their need for the product, then the profitability of an organization is likely to increase. As with internal organizational performance, a lag time might be expected before observing the effects of distant charismatic executive succession on measures of external organizational performance.



Based on the above discussion, it is hypothesized that distant charismatic executive succession should be positively related to measures of change in external organizational performance, and further, these changes may only occur when considered with a lag time.

H3A. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team attendance figure in the year following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H3B. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team attendance figure at a two-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H3C. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team attendance figure at a three-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

Evidence is provided above for the impact of a distant charismatic executive succession on internal and external organizational performance measures. However, there is one more area where the impact might be felt.

### Personnel Turnover

Personnel turnover is another criterion executive succession might influence. The common belief is that a new boss will want to “bring in his or her

own people". Virany, Tushman, and Romanelli (1992) examined microcomputer firms in times of organizational adaptation. These researchers found that the most typical form of organizational adaptation combined CEO succession, sweeping executive level changes, and strategic orientations. Other research also lends partial support to the notion of turnover being associated with executive succession (e.g. Brady & Helmich, 1984; Kelly, 1980).

Personnel turnover is a natural method for changing an organization's culture, and is consistent with some expectations of the attraction-selection-attrition (ASA) framework (Schneider, 1987). Schneider argued that organizations are relatively homogenous in terms of the attributes of the people who work within the organization. Accordingly, attraction to an organization, selection by the organization, and attrition from it will be determined by the existing attributes of the people within the organization. Referring back to Schein (1985), one of the most powerful ways to embed cultural assumptions is through unconscious decisions in recruitment, selection, and excommunication. Recall that leaders cascade their cultural vision throughout an organization. Taken together, the implication is that executive successors may be likely to influence personnel turnover through the introduction and implementation of changes to the existing organizational culture. In fact, this is consistent with the oft-heard phrase, "Management has decided to go in a different direction." Indeed, it may be that organizations experiencing culture change make it systematically difficult for organizational employees who fit well with the previous regime's

organizational culture (Schaubroeck, Ganster, & Jones, 1998). It is possible that those organizational employees in high profile or symbolic positions are even more likely to turnover when an executive succession occurs because the loss of these employees would represent a ceremonial legitimization of change.

Personnel turnover in a symbolic position fits with the notion of ritual scapegoating presented by Gamson and Scotch (1964). Recall that the idea of ritual scapegoating suggested that personnel turnover helped reduce anxiety within an organization when the organization is enveloped by unfortunate outcomes. Ritual is an essential component of significant change (Bolman & Deal, 1997). Rituals help with transitions by providing a concrete action for letting go of the past and moving towards the future.

Based on the above discussion, it is hypothesized that distant charismatic executive succession should be related to an increased likelihood of personnel turnover, but evidence does not support the notion that these changes would require lag time.

H4. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors are significantly more likely to be associated with managerial change within one year of their succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

#### Purpose of the Current Proposed Study and Summary of Hypotheses

In order to advance the literature on executive succession, leader ability must be considered (Day & Lord, 1988; Smith et al., 1984). To date, little if any

research has attempted to classify leader ability according to psychological theory. At the executive level, charisma is one mechanism that should be examined as a potential determinant of leader ability. However, at the executive level, care must be given to making certain that charisma is defined in a manner that is consistent with distant leadership. For example, the primary decision rule for distant charismatic leadership should be whether or not followers make the attribution that the leader is a source of radical change (Weber, 1947; see also Shamir, 1995). The underlying psychological principle is that distant charismatic leaders persuade followers to make this attribution by behaving in a manner consistent with existing charismatic theories and literature (e.g. Shamir et al., 1993; Waldman & Yammarino, 1999). In turn, the followers are proposed to respond with altered motivations that ultimately lead to improved organizational performance. Research supports this very point. Experimental studies conducted by Meindl et al. (1985) indicated that causal attributions were made towards leaders in regards to organizational performance. Farquhar (1989) found that when an executive succession was relevant to an individual, the likelihood of causal attributions towards the executive successor was higher.

As stated earlier, the purpose of the proposed study is to determine if charismatic executive successors are more likely to be associated with changes in organizational performance than are noncharismatic executive successors. Below, the proposed hypotheses are re-stated.

Noting Day and Lord (1988), executive successors may affect internal organizational performance by the direct route of reducing capital or personnel costs, and the indirect route of strengthening productivity norms. Charismatic executive successors may use a combination of these tactics, but are more likely to rely on the indirect route. By motivating followers to make a greater personal commitment to the mission (Shamir et al., 1993), and by engaging in symbolic behaviors (Waldman & Yammarino, 1999), it is expected that charismatic executive successors will influence internal organizational productivity.

H1A. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team winning percentage in the year following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H1B. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team winning percentage at a two-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H1C. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team winning percentage at a three-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H2A. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher likelihood of a pennant within three years

following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H2B. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher likelihood of a World Series Championship within three years following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

Additionally, charismatic executive successors may be expected to influence external organizational productivity. Charismatic executive successors may be able to create more interest in their product by reducing the amount of risk associated with it (Bauer, 1960). By persuading consumers or external stakeholders of a greater future for the organization, either through rhetoric or symbolic action, the distant charismatic executive successor may initiate interest outside the organization.

H3A. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team attendance figure in the year following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H3B. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team attendance figure at a two-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

H3C. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors produce a significantly higher team attendance figure at a three-year lag following succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

Finally, charismatic executive successors might influence personnel turnover. Charismatic executive successors are change agents. To effectively overcome an organization's past, and to welcome a different organizational culture, the homogeneity of the personnel (Schneider, 1987) may need to change. Changes to personnel in symbolic jobs are probably the most likely because these represent an opportunity for a symbolic action on the part of the charismatic executive successor, and also an opportunity to engage in ritual scapegoating (Gamson & Scotch, 1964).

H4. MLB team presidents who are charismatic executive successors are significantly more likely to be associated with managerial change within one year of their succession compared to those MLB team presidents who are noncharismatic executive successors.

## CHAPTER 2

### METHOD

#### Sports Archives

In the present study, I examined executive succession and its effects in MLB. Though it remains a nontraditional setting for research, the use of sports organizations as a data source for executive succession is not new. In the aforementioned seminal work by Grusky (1963), MLB managerial data were used. He pointed to the research advantages of public record of team personnel and team performance. Sports organizations have also served as a data source in other related literature (e.g. Allen, Panian, & Lotz, 1979; Brown, 1982; Cannella & Rowe, 1995; Fabianic, 1984, 1994; Gamson & Scotch, 1964; McTeer, White, & Persad, 1995), as sports archives, particularly baseball archives, remain a popular source for managerial succession research. Slack (1996) reasoned that secondary data for sports has become even more available over the last decade and that it should be utilized more frequently in research. However, consideration must be given to special circumstances surrounding archival data.

Yin (1994) reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of archival records. Strengths included (a) data stability, (b) unobtrusive measurement, (c) exactness, (d) broad coverage, and (e) precision and quantification. Weaknesses included (a) retrievability, (b) access, and (c) biased selectivity, if the collection is incomplete.



More recent work by Simonton (2003) discussed the history of scientific analysis of historical data. Simonton explained the disadvantages and advantages to archival data. He warns of the correlational nature of archival data, the potential lack of reliability, and the potentially limited theoretical applicability of archival data. As positives, Simonton states that archival data may have more external validity than lab experiments, can act as a support to more traditional methods (e.g. lab experiments), might have great practical importance, and allows for an investigation into other time periods. Building off the last point, the current author would add that archival research allows for the examination of data across temporal periods, allowing for a *test of time*.

Ultimately, the use of archival research in executive succession studies and studies of charismatic leadership will depend on the concerns raised by Day and Lord (1988). Can the data control for organizational size? Do the data allow for opportunity to study lag time? When needed, does the data have a related control predictor for year effects? Do the data have a mechanism for distinguishing leader ability? If the answer to all of these questions is yes, and theory is applicable, then archival data is highly appropriate for studies of executive succession.

Equally important is whether or not MLB team presidents are similar to executives in traditional organizations. Sports executives are higher echelon leaders who tend to be distant from players and fans, similar to executives in other industries. Sports executives also serve in many of the same roles as

executives in other industries. According to Carter (1994) professional sports franchise owners, boards of directors, and franchise officers are involved in setting the day-to-day policies and procedures, or setting strategy that the managerial staff employs on a day-to-day basis. Prussel (2003) describes the work of Amy Trask, Chief Executive of the Oakland Raiders. Parallel to executives in traditional organizations, Trask is involved in stadium matters, player contracts, chartering planes, financial oversight and analysis, interaction with local officials and media, and team logistics. Trask is less involved in the actual management of the team. Also similar to their counterparts, sports executives can be measured in relation to lower-level managers, subordinates, players, and customers. An advantage to studying sports executives in a single sport as compared to executives in other industries is that the sports organizations tend to be of similar size, a natural control for a critical measure in executive succession studies.

### Data Sources

All data regarding predictors (executive successions) and criteria (winning percentage, pennants and championships, attendance, and managerial turnover) were obtained from *Total Baseball* (Thorn, Palmer, & Gershman, 2001). *Total Baseball* is the official encyclopedia of MLB and is co-authored by a group of writers, most who are members of the Society for American Baseball Research (SABR). SABR was established in 1971, and part of its mission is to foster the

research and dissemination of the history of baseball (Society for American Baseball Research, 2003). *Total Baseball* is divided into several sections.

Executive succession data were obtained from the *Owner and Executive Roster* section of *Total Baseball* (Thorn et al., 2001). The predictor data were MLB executive successions occurring between 1902 and 1998 (note: given the hypothesized three-year lag time for some hypotheses, this assumes that data will be accumulated from 1901 through 2000). Specifically, changes in a team's listed president counted as a succession. Further, the executive successor needed to be listed as team president for at least three full seasons, as outcome data were gathered for a three-year period. However, multiple executives were possible during the season prior to the executive succession of interest.

If an executive succession occurred during a season, that season of succession was dropped from the data. For example, if a change occurred during the 1946 season, 1946 data were not counted. In this case, the season preceding the executive succession was 1945 and the season following the executive succession was 1947. For both MLB leagues (the American League and the National League), team presidents are listed by team and year of assumed presidency. Several people worked together to obtain the information for the Owner and Executive Roster section from a variety of sources, and the term president was often synonymous with the terms "principal owner" or "managing partner" (J. Thorn, personal communication, October 27, 2003). Thus, in many cases, the team president is also the team owner. In a few cases,

the president is also the general manager. Often, the president is referred to as chairman of the board or CEO. There are several instances where two individuals are listed as the head of the team for several overlapping years (e.g. one individual is listed as president from 1988 through 1997 and a second individual is listed as president from 1991 through 1999). In these instances, because there is effectively no full change in the presidency of the team, the second individual's succession was dismissed from the data. In cases where an individual altered his or her title (e.g. president changes to chairman of the board), no executive changes were assumed.

The first president in a team's history was not considered as an executive successor, nor was the first president following a team's city change. This is because there is no proper comparison data for executive predecessors under those circumstances. Prior to the actual city change for a team, executive succession data were included, meaning the inclusion of teams that have played in multiple cities or have folded (e.g. Boston Braves' data were included). There is one instance where a team moved out of a city one year (Washington DC to Minnesota following the 1960 season), and a new team moved in to that city the next year (Washington DC in 1961). Because the president of the second Washington team lasted only two years, this executive succession will not be considered in the data. For cases where a team changed its name, but remained in the same city (e.g. Los Angeles Angels, California Angels, Anaheim Angels), the team was considered the same throughout the changes.

In one situation (Pittsburgh in 1988), two executive successors, under different titles, took over for their predecessor. Those data, because of the change in leadership, were counted. In two situations (Boston Braves 1901 through 1906; Washington Senators 1913 through 1919), no president was listed for several years. These data points were considered as part of executive predecessor data only. Also, if an individual was a presidential successor multiple times, then only the first occurrence that fits the criteria was used. This was to prevent the possibility of an attribution of charisma being due to a previous success in MLB. Also, the goal was to weight the effects of each executive successor equally. For a summary of the executive succession criteria, refer to Table 1.

Based on the above criteria, 140 changes in top leadership of MLB teams occurred between 1902 and 2000. Appendix C provides a complete listing of these successions.

### Charismatic Executive Successors

To determine which executive successions were charismatic, *Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia* (Pietrusza, Silverman, & Gershman, 2000) was consulted. This source, according to its inside jacket, is the “perfect companion to ... *Total Baseball*.” One of the editors was involved in editing both books. Several of the acknowledgments overlap across books. The primary editor of *Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia* was the president of SABR at the time

of publication. The two books, *Total Baseball* (Thorn et al., 2001) and *Baseball: A Biographical Encyclopedia*, are complementary.

Rather than profiling everyone involved in baseball history, the editors of *Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia* (Pietrusza et al., 2000) elected to profile the 2,000 most significant and influential people in baseball history. Included in these profiles is a sample of the most influential owners and executives. These profiles provide in-depth biographies of an owner's or executive's contribution to the game of baseball. In all, 29 of baseball's executive successors are listed in *Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia*. Charisma, as defined by Weber (1947) is a stable personality trait, and the influence ratings should reflect that. Charisma, by definition, will need to contain influence within it. One issue, however, is that the list of the most influential baseball executives may also contain some noncharismatics.

To supplement these influential executives, the *Total Baseball* (Thorn et al., 2001) section entitled *Team Histories* (Ivor-Campbell & Silverman, 2001) was consulted. Each team history reviews influential moments throughout their existence, and sometimes will note an owner or executive who had great influence on the team. Additionally, 28 executive successors are mentioned in *Total Baseball* (2001) and are not provided with full biographies in *Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia* (2000). In all, 57 executive successors identified as influential and 83 executive successors that are not identified as influential are

included in the current study. However, a link is needed to show that these influential executive successors are actually charismatic.

There is a general trend associated with the executive successors considered influential. Of the 29 presidents in *Baseball: A Biographical Encyclopedia* (Pietrusza et al., 2000), many are referred to with words and phrases like “innovative”, “one of the first”, “willing to take a chance”, “had ideas”, “maverick”, “dynamic”, “unconventional”, “farsightedness”, “ahead of his time”, “unprecedented change”, “transforming”, “genius”, “courage and foresight”, “cared about the fans”, “inspired trust and friendship”, “champion of the masses”, “honesty”, “display of passion”, “character”, “generosity”, and “common man”. These themes are all consistent with several of the categories of charismatic description identified by Shamir (1995) through analysis of several existing charismatic theories (Conger & Kanungo, 1987; House, 1977; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Shamir, House & Arthur, 1993; Weber, 1947; see also Bass, 1985). Support for influential baseball presidents having at least some charismatic qualities is present.

Case studies also provide support for these influential executive successors being charismatic. Consistent with the image building characteristics often ascribed to charismatic leaders (House, 1977) Bill Veeck was known as a populist owner, and portrayed himself as the “common man” by never wearing ties, frequently hanging out at truck-stops, and sitting in the stands with the fans (Pietrusza et al., 2000). In his autobiography (Veeck, 1962), he even stated that,

“Not only doesn’t the city [associated with the team] owe the operator of the franchise anything, but the ball team ... has certain responsibilities toward the city (p. 124).” The implication is that Veeck, as a charismatic leader believed in a moral mission and articulated the mission to anyone who would listen to him (Burns, 1978; House, 1977; Katz & Kahn, 1978). Veeck often donated gate receipts to local charities, and tried to impress upon fans that the team cared about them. He implored the fans to recognize the significance of breaking established attendance records (which Veeck’s teams did), and attempted to include everyone by offering Ladies Day, morning games (upon request of graveyard shift workers), and Fan Appreciation Days.

Branch Rickey told the story of how he and his friend, Charles Thomas, a Black player who played for him while he managed at Ohio Wesleyan, cried together after Thomas had been refused admission into a hotel where the rest of the team was staying (Pietrusza et al., 2000). Rickey referenced this story as the spark that led to his efforts, along with Jackie Robinson, to break the color barrier in MLB. With the inclusion of Robinson, Rickey’s Dodgers won their first pennant in six years, and won two pennants in Robinson’s first three years. From a charismatic and transformational standpoint, Rickey was instrumental in achieving a moral mission (Burns, 1978; Conger & Kanungo, 1987; Katz & Kahn, 1978; Weber, 1947).

Larry MacPhail provided meaning to his teams by example, through referencing history in which he had partaken. According to *Baseball: A*



*Biographical Encyclopedia* (Pietrusza et al., 2000) MacPhail, at the start of World War I, had enlisted in the Army as a private. He rose to the rank of captain, and became involved in a courageous and risky plot to capture Germany's exiled Kaiser Wilhelm. Nearly caught in the act, MacPhail and his team captured only an oddly designed ashtray. MacPhail then survived a court-martialing when war hero General John Pershing endorsed the mission by calling it "crazy", and then stating, "I'd have given a year's pay to have been with those boys in Holland" (p. 694). MacPhail went on to lead successful teams with both the Dodgers and the New York Yankees. His actions in the war helped create an image of a courageous risk taker, and allowed him to serve as a role model for those on the field, two behaviors that House (1977) identifies as associated with charismatic leadership. Examples such as these further demonstrate convergence between being influential and being charismatic.

Use of archival data in leadership studies, including studies of charisma, has been frequent. According to Simonton (2003), the range of archival leadership studies includes monarchs (Winter, 1993), presidents (Simonton, 1988; Zullo & Seligman, 1990), Canadian prime ministers (Ballard, 1983), Soviet Politburo members (Hermann, 1980), army generals (Simonton, 1980; Suedfeld, Corteen & McCormick, 1986), and revolutionaries (Suedfeld & Rank, 1976). Simonton (2003) also acknowledges several archival studies related to leader charisma. Most of these focus on United States Presidents (Deluga, 1997, 1998; House, Spangler & Woycke, 1991; Simonton, 1988).

Simonton (1988) relied on factor analysis to classify presidents according to personality type. He named one of the personality types as charismatic, and it included items loading at .80 or above such as “finds dealing with the press challenging and enjoyable”, “enjoys the ceremonial aspects of the office”, “is charismatic,” “consciously refines his own public image,” “has a flair for the dramatic,” and “conveys clear-cut, highly visible personality.” Presidential biographies were used as the classification data source. DeLuga and House et al. relied on Simonton’s work for their charismatic classification data. House et al. also used other archival data sources, specifically *New York Times* editorials on the day following inauguration, and biographies of at least two of the cabinet members reporting to each president. The biographies were obtained through several sources, with efforts to extract as many as possible from a main source. Charisma was rated according to nine behavioral items provided to raters in written instructions. Opposed to only examining presidential charisma, O’Connor, Mumford, Clifton, Gessner, and Connelly (1995) examined charismatic leaders from all occupations. These leaders were identified using general history texts, almanacs, biographical listings, and encyclopedias. Three graduate students identified the 286 charismatic leaders used in the initial sample with charisma defined as the attainment of an identifiable pinnacle position of responsibility where the ability to effect profound change in organizations and organizational members was exhibited. One especially notable feature of the O’Connor et al. definition is that it does not rely on biases

created from definitions of charisma that are geared towards close leaders. When using archives to study charismatic leadership, the key is to operationalize charisma according to theory, and standardize the sources as much as possible.

### MLB Team Presidents and Team Owners

A potential issue that needs consideration is how much power a MLB team president really has. Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) suggest that mayors may have to share their power with others, and base this assumption on previous work that presented organizations as coalitions (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1962). More recently, agency theorists have proposed a separation of organization shareholders from top managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To maintain control over their wealth, rather than being subjected to the whims of top managers, shareholders use a number of devices including contracts, boards of directors, and compensation (see Eisenhardt, 1989 for a review). In a similar vein, MLB team presidents may be limited by whether or not they are also the team owners. Combining the executive succession data with an ownership history compiled by Quirk and Fort (1992) indicates that 67% (94 of 140) of the executive successions involved MLB team presidents who were also majority owners, partial owners, or related to owners (e.g. son-in-law). Of the owners, 40.7% (44 of 94) fall into the charismatic category. Non-owners represent a lesser proportion, 29% (13 of 46), of the charismatic category. To deal with this discrepancy, the analyses were run twice, one time including all the data, and

one time including only the data representing executive successors who are also owners.

### Outcomes (Criteria)

Winning Percentage. All data regarding winning percentage were obtained from the *Total Baseball* (2001) section entitled "Annual Record". This section contains winning percentage data from all teams between 1900 and 2000. Pennant and championship data were obtained from the *Total Baseball* section entitled "Postseason Play" (Ivor-Campbell & Pietrusza). Between the years 1900 and 2000, the World Series was played every year except 1901, 1902, 1904, and 1994. Data affected by these years were not included in testing World Series hypotheses.

When examining internal performance measures, organizational predictors become prevalent. Many researchers have noted the importance of controlling for organizational size (Day & Lord, 1988; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981) because it may influence the number of resources an organization has available, and as a consequence the productivity of an organization. Hall (1972) also suggested that a larger organization would lessen the influence of any individual. One of the benefits of a sample drawn from an industry with rules governing team size, like baseball, is that there is a natural control for organizational size. All teams are limited to the same number of players on their roster, and the players are the employees who are most likely to affect winning percentage. Regarding the size of the rest of the organization,

there is likely to be little variance in organizational structure and so organizational size tends to be highly similar.

A second organizational predictor that can influence internal performance, according to Salancik and Pfeffer (1977) is economic base. The proper parallel in a study of sports organizations is payroll. That is, how many resources is an organization willing to direct towards personnel? Beyond Salancik and Pfeffer, this is a predictor that is rarely controlled for in executive succession studies, with the implicit assumption that the organization maintains the same amount of resource allocation through the transition of one top executive to the next. This may or may not be the case, but seems like an important question when examining MLB executive successors who may have different payrolls than their executive predecessors. Unfortunately, MLB teams have never made their accounting figures available to public record, and player salary information was only available to owners prior to the formation of player unions (Quirk & Fort, 1992).<sup>2</sup> Thus, a lack of control for payroll becomes a limitation to the current study, but this limitation is shared with nearly all the prior research on executive succession.

Attendance. Information regarding attendance was obtained from the section *Total Baseball* entitled Major League Attendance (Tiemann, 2001). This section contains MLB attendance sorted by overall attendance, league, team, and year. All data points between the years of 1900 and 2000 are included (i.e. there is no missing data).

Attendance is a criterion with many influential predictors. In addition to lag time, several other sources of variance must be accounted for, in order to examine the true effects of leader influence on attendance. First, a team's performance will influence attendance (Schofield, 1983). The better that a team performs, the more likely casual fans are to attend future games. This relationship has been recognized in a number of sports (e.g. football; Noll, 1974), but most studies have examined baseball (e.g. Baade & Tiehen, 1990; Fullerton & Merz, 1982; Greenstein & Marcum, 1981; Porter & Scully, 1982; Whitney, 1988). Anecdotal evidence about "fair weather" fans also supports this contention. Data on winning percentage, as described above, were already available, and used as a control for attendance.

A second predictor that likely plays a role in attendance is the state of baseball attendance in general. While past research has demonstrated a mixed effect of environmental predictors such as GNP (Weiner & Mahoney, 1981; Lieberman & O'Connor, 1972), researchers still urge the inclusion of these measures. Common sense also dictates this consideration. For example, comparing the years during World War II and the years just after World War II requires some consideration of overall attendance. Overall industry attendance was obtained according to league rather than overall attendance. This is due to the fact that the American League and National League tallied attendance differently (paid attendance versus actual attendance) for many years within the time period of interest.

Personnel Turnover. Managerial turnover data were obtained from the *Total Baseball* (2001) section entitled Team Rosters. This section includes a listing of all managers for a team in a given year, including those managers designated as “interim” or “head coaches”. All managerial data were included in the analysis.

A summary of all outcome criteria sources is provided in Table 2.

Analytical Approach.

Multiple Regression. Standard multiple regression was used to test hypotheses 1 and 3. Multiple regression is particularly appropriate when trying to understand how multiple predictor variables influence a specific criterion variable (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Effectively, multiple regression cannot indicate causality, but does indicate the degree of relationship between predictors and criteria, and the importance of each predictor with respect to the criterion. Past research in executive succession has used sequential regression or stepwise regression (e.g. Lieberman & O'Connor, 1972; Smith et. al, 1984). However, Weiner and Mahoney (1981) presented evidence that the executive succession predictor often covaries with other predictors, and recommended the use of standard multiple regression. Day and Lord (1988) suggested that standard multiple regression is a preferred solution for assessing the unique variance of each predictor by focusing on semi-partial correlations. A semi-partial correlation in standard multiple regression reflects the explained variance of the criterion (e.g. organizational performance) that would be lost when removing the predictor

associated with the semi-partial correlation. Thus, in order to assess the unique contribution of the executive successor, the current study used standard multiple regression.

Several statistical assumptions are associated with multiple regression. The first assumption of standard multiple regression relates to sample size. The sample requirements for standard multiple regression include  $N = 50 + 8m$  ( $m$  equals the number of predictors) to compute the multiple correlation, and  $N = 104 + m$  to test the influence of individual predictors (Tabachnik & Fidell, 1996). The current study met both requirements.

Standard multiple regression is sensitive to outliers (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996). Tests were run for univariate and multivariate outliers. Boxplots were created for each of the eight continuous variables in the study. Only one case was well beyond the whiskers of a boxplot. This extreme case represented Charles Murphy, who succeeded to president of the Chicago Cubs in 1906 when the Cubs set the record for the highest winning percentage in MLB history at .763. Z-scores confirmed that Murphy, a charismatic successor, was not a univariate outlier, but was 3.21 standard deviations above the mean. Because Murphy's score was toward the extreme, it was decided to run the data twice, once including his data and a second time without his data and any associated multivariate outliers.

To test for multivariate outliers, the Mahalabonis distance was determined. Mahalabonis distance is a test for within-group multivariate outliers. Looking at



the 10 cases with the largest Mahalabonis distance, a significance test of  $p < .001$  was used to determine if a case is significantly different from the other cases. Stevens (1996) suggests that if multivariate outliers are found, then analyses can be run twice. For the first analysis, the outliers are included. For the second analysis, the outliers are dropped. In the second analysis, once an outlier is dropped, the Mahalabonis distance test is repeated, and the same procedure followed until no outliers are left in the data. For the current data, after the removal of Murphy no multivariate outliers were found.

No evidence for violations of normality, linearity, homoscedasticity, or multicollinearity was present. On a final note, all variables were confirmed to have existing ranges and plausible values.

For hypothesis 1, as to specific entry, executive succession was coded according to charisma (coded 1 for charismatic executive successors and coded 0 for noncharismatic executive successors). Winning percentage, a standardized score, was entered as the criterion variable. Each row contained, as separate pieces of data, the winning percentage for the year leading up to the executive succession, and for each of the three years following the succession. For hypothesis 1A, only the data from the year prior to succession and the data from the year following the executive succession were entered. The same procedure was adjusted accordingly for hypothesis 1B and 1C, with the year prior to succession entered as a predictor variable for 1A, 1B, and 1C. For each test, examination of the  $r^2$  value indicated how much of the variance is explained by

the overall model (all the predictors entered at once). However, the hypotheses for the current study do not represent predictions about the overall model, and so the significance of multiple  $r$  was an indicator that there is reason to look at the specific predictors, but multiple  $r$  was irrelevant to inferences regarding the specific hypotheses. Inspection of the beta coefficients indicated the variance explained by each individual predictor. If the significance value fit the criteria of  $p < .05$ , then a predictor was considered significant. Because the beta coefficients can be influenced by variance explained by other predictors, a different method was needed to determine the full contribution by a predictor. In order to determine how much unique variance a predictor was responsible for in a criterion, the semi-partial correlation column was observed and squared.

For hypothesis 3, as to specific entry, executive succession was coded according to charisma (coded 1 for charismatic executive successors and coded 0 for noncharismatic executive successors), and entered as a predictor. A z-score was created representing each data point as compared to the overall attendance in that particular league for a specific year. The resulting standardized attendance score was entered as the criterion variable. Each row contained, as separate pieces of data, the standardized attendance score for the year leading up to the executive succession, and standardized attendance scores for each of the three years following the succession. For hypothesis 3A, only the data from the year prior to succession and the data from the year following the executive succession were entered. The same procedure was

adjusted accordingly for hypothesis 3B and 3C, with the standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession entered as a predictor variable for 3A, 3B, and 3C. The winning percentage for the corresponding year in each hypothesis was entered as a control variable.

Chi-square. To test hypotheses 2 and 4, related to frequency effects, a chi-square test was most appropriate provided that the statistical assumptions were met (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1992). Assumptions of the chi-square test include independence of observations and size of expected frequencies. A recommendation for expected frequencies is that the size of every cell in a chi-square is greater than 5.

For hypothesis 4, these assumptions were met, and alpha was set at  $p < .05$ , with a critical value of  $\chi^2 > 3.84$ . However, the assumptions were not met for hypothesis 2. The requirement of independent observations was violated. That is, the mere act of one team capturing a pennant or championship prevents other teams from capturing that pennant or championship in the same year. To account for this difference, a conservative precaution was implemented by setting a more stringent significance level was set at  $p < .01$ . For hypothesis 2A and hypothesis 2B, there is only one degree of freedom. This meant that a critical value of  $\chi^2 > 6.63$  would provide support for each hypothesis. The expected frequencies were determined for each hypothesis and compared to the observed frequencies. By comparing the expected frequencies to the observed frequencies, a  $\chi^2$  value was obtained, and compared to the critical value.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESULTS

Preliminary Analysis. Prior to data analysis, descriptive statistics were calculated. Tables 3, 4 and 5 provide these data. Of the 140 successors, 57 (40.7%) fit the criteria for charismatic, and 83 (59.3%) did not fit the criteria for charisma. Ninety-four successors owned or partly owned the team during their tenure, while forty-six successors had no ownership. Additionally, of the 94 who were also owners, 44 were also charismatic, with the remaining 50 classified as not charismatic. Through logical extension, examination of the 57 charismatic successors in the overall sample indicated that the 44 successors who were also owners represented 77% of the total charismatic population. A smaller portion, 50 of the 83 (60%) successors who were not charismatic, owned teams.

The total years served as president ranged from three years to forty-four years. Three-year successions represented the mode with 23 presidents (16.4%) serving as president for that length of time. The mean tenure was 9.5 years. Examining only presidents who were also owners, the mode for the tenure remained at three years, but the mean jumped slightly to 11.32 years.

For the winning percentage variables, ranges reached as low as .25, and as high as .76. The mean for winning percentage varied from .480 (representing the year prior to succession) to .498 (representing the first year after succession). For the attendance variable, standardized scores representing the industry attendance by league ranged from -2.20 to 2.62. Notably, for the year prior to

succession, the mean standardized attendance score was  $-.183$ . For the three years following succession, the mean standardized scores remained negative, but the lowest mean of those years was  $-.067$ .

Effect Size. Past research has indicated that as much as 40% of the variance in organization performance can be explained by executive succession (Day & Lord, 1988), and with control variables and the separation of charismatic executive successors from noncharismatic executive successors, a higher effect might be expected. Nonetheless, a conservative effect size of  $\omega^2 = .06$  (Cohen, 1977) was predicted because even a finding of that magnitude is useful in moving forward the research in executive succession. To achieve an adequate level of power, approximately  $.80$  (Cohen, 1965, 1977; Hinkle & Oliver, 1983), with a medium effect size, a sample size of approximately 60 per group, 120 for the overall sample, was needed. Thus, the attained N of 140 successions, 57 influential and 83 non-influential, approximated the power requirements for the current study. Actual effect size was represented by  $r^2$  and is included in the results that follow.

Primary Analyses. Each hypothesis was tested, and additional exploratory analyses, not directly stated in the hypotheses, were also undertaken. Support was found for the effects of charismatic successors on internal stakeholders (hypothesis 1C) and external stakeholders (hypothesis 3A). Additional analyses, examining two-year successions, suggested partial support for effects on internal stakeholders at earlier time points in the succession (hypothesis 1A). No support

was found during any analyses for the differential effects of charismatic successors on turnover (hypothesis 4). Support was found for an association between charismatic successors and success within industry (hypothesis 2A), but the support was not consistent for top achievement within industry (hypothesis 2B). Examination of an ownership subsample produced similar results to the overall sample. Division of the sample into four historical era subsamples produced no significant results, however, the division of the sample into two historical era subsamples suggested that one historical era was providing little in terms of explanatory power for the overall sample. Hypotheses and additional analyses are discussed in more detail on the following pages.

### Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1 related to charismatic succession and increased winning percentage following succession. For hypothesis 1A, using all 140 data points, the first portion of Table 6 presents the correlation matrix. Both charisma and winning percentage for the year prior to succession are positively correlated with winning percentage for the first year following succession, although only the correlation for winning percentage for the year prior to succession was significant. Further, charisma and winning percentage for the year prior to succession are correlated only at  $-.007$ . The first portion of Table 7 presents the regression summary. For the model,  $r^2 = .347$ ,  $F(2, 137) = 36.329$ ,  $p < .001$ . Thus, charisma and winning percentage for the year prior to succession significantly predicted winning percentage for the year following succession. In

order to assess whether one or both predictors are driving that prediction, the beta coefficients needed to be assessed. The first portion of Table 8 presents these regression weights. Winning percentage for the year prior to succession had a beta weight of .574,  $p < .05$ , uniquely accounting for approximately 32.9% of the variance in winning percentage for first year following succession. Charisma had a beta weight of .133,  $p > .05$ . While charisma would have been significant, if a more lenient significance level had been employed, it should also be noted that the Durbin-Watson result was substantially lower than 2, suggesting some consideration be given to the possibility of positive autocorrelation, and increased Type I error. Thus, a more stringent significance level might have been more appropriate. Accurately, winning percentage for the year prior to succession was the only significant predictor of winning percentage for the first year following succession.

For hypothesis 1B, the second portion of Table 6 presents the correlation matrix. Once again, charisma and winning percentage for the season prior to succession are each positively correlated with winning percentage for the second year following succession. The second portion of Table 7 presents the regression summary. For the model,  $r^2 = .175$ ,  $F(2, 137) = 14.486$ ,  $p < .001$ . Thus, charisma and winning percentage for the year prior to succession significantly predicted winning percentage for the second year following succession. The second portion of Table 8 presents the regression weights for each predictor. Winning percentage for the year prior to succession had a beta



weight of .406,  $p < .001$ , uniquely accounting for approximately 16.5% of the variance in winning percentage for the first year following succession. Charisma had a beta weight of .103,  $p > .05$ . Regarding the second year following succession, only winning percentage for the year prior to succession was a significant predictor.

For hypothesis 1C, the third portion of Table 6 presents the correlation matrix. Charisma and winning percentage for the season prior to succession are each significantly positively correlated with winning percentage for the third year following succession, with charisma spiking upward from the previous two years of succession ( $r = .221$ ). The third portion of Table 7 presents the regression summary. For the model,  $r^2 = .198$ ,  $F(2, 137) = 16.889$ ,  $p < .001$ . Charisma and winning percentage for the year prior to succession significantly predicted winning percentage for the third year following succession. The third portion of Table 8 presents the regression weights for each predictor. Winning percentage for the year prior to succession had a beta weight of .386,  $p < .001$ , uniquely accounting for approximately 14.9% of the variance in winning percentage for third year following succession. Of the three years under study, this was the lowest explained variance for winning percentage for the year prior to succession, and was expected because the further removed from that year, the more opportunity for change. Charisma had a beta weight of .224,  $p < .05$ , uniquely accounting for 5% of the variance in winning percentage for the third year following succession. Both winning percentage for the year prior to

succession and charisma were significant predictors of winning percentage in the third year following succession. Thus, using all cases, hypothesis 1C was supported, but hypothesis 1A and 1B were not supported.

Analyses for hypotheses 1 were run a second time without the outlier, Murphy. Results of these analyses are shown in Tables 9-11. There were no differences in the findings for analyses run including all cases, and those analyses run without the outlier.

### Hypothesis 2

For hypothesis 2A, regarding a higher likelihood of charismatic successors than noncharismatic successors being associated with pennants, the expected frequencies were 11.4 for charismatic successors and 16.6 for the noncharismatic successors. The observed frequencies were 18 and 10 respectively. The chi-square was significant,  $\chi^2(139) = 8.06$ ,  $p < .01$ . This indicated support for hypothesis 2A.

For hypothesis 2B, regarding a higher likelihood of charismatic successors than noncharismatic successors being associated with World Series championships, the expected frequencies were 6.5 for charismatic successors and 9.5 for noncharismatic successors. The observed frequencies were 11 and 5 respectively. The chi-square, however, was not significant,  $\chi^2(139) = 5.88$ ,  $p > .01$ . Consequently, hypothesis 2B is not supported.

### Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3 related to charismatic succession and increased attendance following succession, while controlling for industry effects and winning percentage. For hypothesis 3A, the first portion of Table 12 presents the correlation matrix. The z-score for the year prior to succession, and winning percentage for the first year following succession are significantly positively correlated with the standardized attendance score for the first year following succession, and charisma has a positive but not significant correlation. The standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession, and winning percentage for the first year following succession are correlated at .507, hinting that they ultimately may explain some of the same variance in the criterion. The first portion of Table 13 presents the regression summary. For the model,  $r^2 = .764$ ,  $F(3, 136) = 147.065$ ,  $p < .001$ . The combined variables significantly predicted standardized attendance score in the first year following succession. The first portion of Table 14 presents the regression weights for each predictor. The standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession had a beta weight of .579,  $p < .001$ , and uniquely accounted for approximately 25.0% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the first year following succession. Winning percentage for the first year following succession had a beta weight of .413,  $p < .001$ , and uniquely accounted for 12.3% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the first year following succession. Charisma had a beta weight of .094,  $p < .05$ , and uniquely accounted for 0.9% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the first year following

succession. Thus, charisma was a significant predictor of the standardized attendance score for the first year following succession, supporting hypothesis 3A, although charisma accounted for only a small portion of the variance.

For hypothesis 3B, the second portion of Table 12 presents the correlation matrix. Charisma, the standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession, and winning percentage for the second year following succession are positively correlated with the standardized attendance score for the second year following succession. The standardized score for the year prior to succession, and winning percentage for the second year following succession are correlated at .425, again suggesting potential shared variance explained. The second portion of Table 13 presents the regression summary. For the model,  $r^2 = .665$ ,  $F(3, 136) = 89.934$ ,  $p < .001$ . The combined variables significantly predicted the standardized attendance score for the second year following succession. The second portion of Table 14 presents the regression weights for each predictor. The standardized attendance score in the year prior to succession had a beta weight of .449,  $p < .001$ , and uniquely accounted for approximately 16.4% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the second year following succession. Winning percentage for the second year following succession had a beta weight of .513,  $p < .001$ , and uniquely accounted for 21.3% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the second year following succession. Charisma had a beta weight of .037,  $p > .05$ .

For hypothesis 3C, the third portion of Table 12 presents the correlation matrix. Charisma, the standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession, and winning percentage for the third year following succession are significantly positively correlated with the standardized attendance score for the third year following succession. The standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession, and winning percentage for the third year following succession are correlated at .396, again suggesting shared variance explained, but following a trend of a lesser relationship each year. The third portion of Table 13 presents the regression summary. For the model,  $r^2 = .620$ ,  $F(3, 136) = 73.906$ ,  $p < .001$ . The combined variables significantly predicted the standardized attendance score for the third year following succession. The third portion of Table 14 presents the regression weights for each predictor. The standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession had a beta weight of .328,  $p < .001$ , and uniquely accounted for approximately 8.9% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the second year following succession. Winning percentage for the third year following succession had a beta weight of .585,  $p < .001$ , and uniquely accounted for 27.0% of the variance in the standardized attendance score for the third year following succession. Charisma had a beta weight of .058,  $p > .05$ . In sum, hypothesis 3A was supported, but hypothesis 3B and 3C were not supported.

Analyses for hypotheses 3 were run a second time without the outlier, Murphy. Results of these analyses are shown in Tables 15-17. There were no

differences in the findings for analyses run including all cases, and those analyses run without the outlier.

#### Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4 suggested that charismatic successors would be more likely than noncharismatic successors to be associated with managerial changes during the first year following succession. For hypothesis 4 regarding frequency of managerial turnover, a chi-square test was appropriate (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1992). The interest is differences in frequencies. Assumptions of the chi-square test include independence of observations and size of expected frequencies. Independence of observations is met because the act of one team changing their manager has no relationship to another team changing their manager. A recommendation for expected frequencies is that the size of every cell in a chi-square is greater than 5. The current sample exceeded that expectation.

For hypothesis 4, there is only one degree of freedom, and alpha was set at  $p < .05$ . That meant that a critical value of  $\chi^2 > 3.84$  would provide support for each hypothesis. For three-year successions it was expected that charismatic successors would make 30.9 managerial changes, and that noncharismatics would make 26.1 managerial changes. The observed frequencies were 28 managerial changes for charismatic successors, and 29 managerial changes for noncharismatic successors. Results showed a chi-square that was not significant,  $\chi^2(139) = 1.033$ ,  $p > .05$ . It was concluded that charisma was not predictive of managerial change.

### Exploratory Analyses.

Owners. As a follow-up analysis to hypotheses 1 and 3, consideration was given to whether the results might be different when examining those presidents who were also owners. To test this, the sample was split, and only those presidents who were also owners were kept in the subsample ( $n = 94$ ). Tables 18-24 present the results of these analyses.

The overall findings were similar to the findings discussed regarding hypotheses 1 and 3. One discrepancy was that the finding for charisma as a significant predictor of winning percentage for the third year following succession was only significant at the  $p < .05$  level. Notably, the Durbin-Watson statistic was no longer alarming for predictions associated with the winning percentage for the first year following succession. However, the Durbin-Watson statistic became an issue for predictions associated with the winning percentage for the third year following succession. Indications of potential positive autocorrelation were present. If the significance level were changed from  $p < .05$  to the more stringent  $p < .01$ , then the findings regarding winning percentage in for the third year following succession would no longer be significant. Further, when examining only owners, the variance explained by charismatic successors for the standardized attendance score for the first year following succession increased from 0.9% to 1.1%.

Historical Era (Time). As another follow-up, consideration was given to the era when the executive succession took place. With MLB, there are periods

where significant changes took place that could influence the options available to a team president for changing his or her organization. Four time periods were identified, and were consistent with divisions used by *The Sports Encyclopedia: Baseball 2000* (Neft, Cohen, & Neft). The first time period included successions where the successor's first year occurred in 1901-1919. The second time period was 1920-1945. The third era was 1946-1972. The fourth time period was 1973-2000. Thorn (2001) offered historical perspectives on changes in baseball throughout time.

The year 1920 was marked as a changing point because in 1920, MLB employed its first commissioner. Also, in 1920, the spitball was outlawed, and the ball was more frequently replaced during the game making the ball livelier. During the 1920s, Branch Rickey started modeling the use of a string of farm clubs to develop players.

The next major change point was identified as 1946. In 1946, Jackie Robinson signed a contract with the Brooklyn Dodgers, becoming the first African-American MLB player of the modern era. Robinson reached the Major Leagues in 1947 and pioneered the path for others to join the Major Leagues. World War II veterans, some whom were players, returned to the United States. Many of the veterans were introduced to baseball for the first time during the war, and had taken an interest in it, providing potential new fans. The College World Series began in 1947. Franchise shifts received serious consideration beginning in the 1950s, with the first true franchise shifts taking place in 1953.



The final change point identified was 1973. The Curt Flood case, challenging the legality of MLB's reserve clause went to the courts in 1970, and was decided in 1971. At the beginning of the 1972 season, a 13-day player strike occurred, changing the tone of owner-player relations. The designated hitter was introduced to the American League in 1973. In 1975, the Messersmith-McNally case was decided with a ruling that a player could establish his right of free agency by playing out his option year without a signed contract. Additionally, in 1970 and 1971, three new artificial turf stadiums were introduced.

Unfortunately, the eras represented small subsamples that lacked statistical power. The 1901-1919 era ( $n = 26$ ), 1920-1945 era ( $n = 28$ ), and 1946-1972 era ( $n = 29$ ) were too small to analyze individually, and attempted analyses revealed a general lack of findings. However, when these three eras were combined and analyzed, findings differed from analysis of the overall sample. Tables 25-30 depict these findings. Specifically, charisma is a significant predictor ( $p < .05$ ) of winning percentage for the first year following succession. This differed from previous analyses. Similar to previous analyses, charisma predicted winning percentage for the third year following succession. Although previously charisma predicted standardized attendance score for the first year following succession, that relationship is no longer significant when analyzing the data from 1901-1972. Analysis of the 1973-2000 subsample ( $n = 57$ ) revealed no significant findings.

Two-year Successions. An additional exploratory step was added to the analyses to increase sample size, and examine the possibility of a restriction of range. MLB presidents who served two-year terms were added to the original sample. This action added 20 new presidents to the sample, as shown in Appendix D. However, two of the presidents from the original three-year succession sample had to be removed because their two-year term occurred prior to their more extended terms. The two presidents removed from the sample were Al Rosen and William DeWitt. Rosen's term beginning in 1981 was removed, and his term beginning in 1978 was added. DeWitt's term beginning in 1962 was removed, and his term beginning in 1949 was added.

With the new sample, descriptive statistics were obtained, and these statistics are highlighted in Tables 31 and 32. All of the newly added successors were not charismatic, causing the new sample to have 57 charismatic successors and 101 successors that were not charismatic. Not surprisingly, most of the means for continuous variables in the study were lower compared to the three-year succession means (refer back to Table 4 for three-year succession descriptive statistics). The mean number of years for tenure of the successor dropped from 9.53 to 8.63. The means for winning percentage were fairly stable, but in no case was there a mean in the two-year data that surpassed the three-year data. Each mean for the standardized attendance score decreased in the two-year data when compared to the three-year data.

For the two-year analyses, all data were screened in accordance with the procedures described for the three-year data. Three univariate outliers were identified. Again, Murphy of the Cubs was the most extreme. However, after the removal of Murphy, Myron Wilson of the Cleveland Indians and Paul Beeston of the Toronto Blue Jays also were outliers. Wilson's Indians compiled a .720 winning percentage in 1953, the fourth highest winning percentage in MLB history between 1900-2000. In 1991, Beeston's Blue Jays became the first team ever to draw four million fans, and no other team in the American League drew as many as three million fans. It should be noted that z-scores did not indicate these three cases as outliers. However, as with the three-year successions, the data were run both with and without the three cases. Results of these analyses are available in Tables 33-44.

Table 35 shows that when running the analyses with all two-year successions, charisma is a significant predictor of winning percentage for the first year following succession. Thus, there is support for hypothesis 1A.

Hypothesis 2 was run a second time with the two-year successions. Again, support was found for hypothesis 2A,  $\chi^2(157) = 14.04, p < .01$ . This time, however, support was also found for hypothesis 2B,  $\chi^2(157) = 10.284, p < .01$ .

As with previous analyses, charisma significantly predicted the standardized attendance score, supporting hypothesis 3A. When the analyses are run minus the outliers, only hypothesis 3A is supported.

Hypothesis 4 was tested with two-year successions, and again, the results were not significant,  $\chi^2(157) = .812, p > .05$ . Charismatic successors are no more likely than noncharismatic successors to make a managerial change in the first year following succession.

Similar results are found when running the analyses using only an ownership subsample ( $n = 100$ ). Tables 45-50 contain the analyses of the two-year succession ownership subsample.

## CHAPTER 4

### DISCUSSION

The present study examined the effects of charismatic and noncharismatic distant executive successions on organizational performance. Specifically, the associations between these successions and criteria that includes internal organizational performance, external organizational performance, and turnover were examined. Currently, the findings and contributions related to those findings are reviewed. Also, expected strengths and limitations are noted, and implications and applications receive attention.

#### Specific Findings

The results of this study partially supported the hypothesis that leader ability, defined as charisma, makes a difference in important outcomes following executive succession. This support is demonstrated through the findings related to winning percentage, pennant and World Series frequency, and attendance. These findings are consistent with other work (Day & Lord, 1988; Smith et al., 1984) that urged consideration of leader ability in executive succession studies. Taken together, the findings from past research combined with the findings of the current study indicate a need to not only consider leader ability, but to also define it when undertaking studies of executive succession.

From the current research, findings indicated a relationship between charismatic executive succession and (a) internal organizational performance, (b)

external organizational performance, but not (c) personnel turnover. Day and Lord (1988) cautioned against the use of one universal performance outcome across all levels of an organization, advising that executive levels clearly require different criteria than lower levels of an organization do. Too often, executive succession studies are plagued by tunnel vision that leads to examination only of basic criteria such as profitability. Day and Lord refer to these criteria as criteria of convenience. The problem with criteria of convenience is that, alone, such criteria fail to help us measure the full domain of performance, the ultimate criterion (Thorndike, 1949). As earlier noted, House and Baetz (1979) argue that plenty of leadership criteria exist that receive little examination. When studying criteria, it is also important to decide what group is associated with different criteria. The current study's findings support effects for on-field personnel (internal stakeholders), and fans (external stakeholders), whereas past research usually does not distinguish between these stakeholders. Notably, the effects are more pronounced for internal stakeholders than for external stakeholders, and these effects occur at different periods in time.

#### Winning Percentage, Pennants, and World Series

Internal organizational performance may be the category of criteria most studied with lower levels of organizations. However, an argument can be made that internal organizational performance is relevant to studies of higher levels of organizations that may involve distant charismatic leadership. Charismatic leaders are purported to cause changes in the motivation of followers. If this

assumed cause and effect relationship is accurate, then followers should perform at higher levels, and changes in internal organizational performance should be observable. In the current study, it is likely that the actions and behaviors of charismatic MLB team presidents influenced internal organizational performance outcomes including winning percentage and post-season performance.

Although support was found for charismatic effects on winning percentage, it is interesting that only the findings for the third year following succession were consistently significant and robust. Differences seemed to exist for the first year following succession as well, but were less significant and less robust. When combined with the fact that the second year following succession showed no signs of a relationship with charisma, and then analyzed, several possibilities and issues come to mind.

One possibility is that the results related to the first year following succession were spurious, and that it takes approximately three years for the successor's influence to manifest. The low Durbin-Watson score, in some of the analysis, suggests that artificial variance may exist as a result of increased variability for the more extreme scores. However, the findings for the two-year successions (see Tables 34 and 35), where the Durbin-Watson score is appropriate, and significant findings for the first year following succession are present, helps refute the argument of spurious findings.

A second possibility is that a Hawthorne or novelty effect is occurring in the first year of any succession, and masking any stronger effects provided by

the presence of a charismatic successor, by restricting the range of variance. Indeed, a review of the descriptive statistics, such as those in Table 4, indicate that the mean winning percentage rises to the highest level in the first year following succession. If this possibility were true, it would also be expected that a majority of the cases would show an increase in winning percentage for the first year following succession. An analysis of the three-year successions demonstrated that only 73 of the 140 cases showed an improvement. This is almost identical to the second year following succession where 70 of the 140 cases show an increase in winning percentage over the year prior to succession, and is similar to the third year following succession where 79 of the 140 cases show an improvement. The idea of a novelty effect is also countered by the lack of significant findings for the second year following succession, where it would be expected that the novelty effect would expire, and only charismatic successors would influence winning percentage. It should be noted that Helmich (1975) has suggested a solution to that discrepancy by stating that a successor's leadership style changes after two years in office. Nonetheless, the overall evidence does not seem to support the idea of a novelty effect.

A third alternative is that the overall successor influence takes time to develop, and that only partial influence may occur at the outset. For example, Kelly (1980) argued that successors have a six-month grace period, and move slowly to make changes, and delay the attack of strategic problems. Gabarro (1986), as discussed in Kesner and Seborá (1994), noted that learning the job of



top manager takes time. He identified five stages including (a) taking hold, (b) immersion, (c) reshaping, (d) consolidation, and (e) refinement. A variation on this developmental concept may help explain the winning percentage findings in the current study. It may be that the charismatic president of a team enters the foray, and rather than making major personnel changes, immediately attempts charismatic behaviors with the current internal personnel. However, it may become apparent that the motivational techniques of the charismatic successor, for whatever reason (e.g. prior history of the team), are not entirely influencing the self-concepts of the followers. Specifically, the expected heightening of self-esteem, increased self-efficacy, increased collective efficacy, and value internalization is occurring, but reaches a ceiling. This may be combined with a general lack of ability for followers to fulfill the requirements of the vision. Thus, there is an increase in winning percentage, but it does not satisfy the ideology of the charismatic successor. As a result, the charismatic successor assesses the personnel and the situation, realizes he or she cannot achieve the vision with the current personnel, and makes personnel changes as appropriate. These changes may occur over the course of the second year, or the still existing vision may take time to cascade to new personnel. Thus, in the third year, winning percentage increases. This developmental hypothesis would help to explain the modest effects for the first year following succession and the lack of effects for the second year following succession, as well as the robust effects for the third year following succession.

The higher association of charismatic successors with pennants and World Series was expected. The charismatic leader activates follower self-concepts, and activated self-concepts lead to higher motivation. In turn, it is expected that higher motivation is associated with higher performance. The goal of the charismatic president is not to be a better team. Instead, the goal is to be the best team in the industry.

### Attendance

Day and Lord (1988) implied that executives are most likely to influence criteria related to external organizational performance. Past research has often found support for this relationship (see Kesner & Sebor, 1994 for a review). Similar to Smith et al. (1984), the current research reflected a relationship between executive succession and attendance. However, the current research intended to investigate the argument that the link is due to charismatic leadership versus unspecified leader ability as defined by salary. The current research demonstrated the link between executive succession and attendance by examining MLB team presidents, a job more aligned with the roles and responsibilities of executives than that of clergy.

Considering past findings on the relationship between executive succession and external organizational performance, the results in the current study relating to attendance were disappointing. There was a significant relationship between charisma and attendance for the first year following succession. However, that relationship explained approximately 1% of the

variance in the standardized attendance score. It was expected that charismatic successors would be responsible for explaining a greater share of the variance in attendance. Part of the reason for this is that, as demonstrated in this study, attendance for the season prior to succession and winning percentage for the season under study are key factors in predicting attendance. Thus much of the unique variance is already explained. Even so, there was unique variance remaining that charisma failed to explain. One potential reason for this lack of findings may be the baseline. The mean for the standardized attendance score for the year prior to succession, as shown in Table 4, was  $-.1830$ . Nearly two-thirds of the teams improved their attendance the following year when compared to other teams in their league. The earlier mentioned novelty effect may be more relevant to fans (external stakeholders) than to internal stakeholders. However, as with winning percentage, if the novelty effect is accurate, then a significant effect for charismatic successors should have been present in the second and third year following succession, when the novelty expires. In fact, the mean remains approximately the same for all three years of succession. A plausible alternative explanation for the overall jump in attendance from the year prior to succession to the years following succession is regression to the mean.

It should be remembered that, despite the modesty, there were significant findings for charisma as a predictor of an increase in attendance in the first year following succession. There is reason to believe that further investigation is needed into the relationship between charismatic executive successors and

external stakeholders. The issue may not be one of no relationship, but instead refinement of the measurement. Perhaps the proper measure for external stakeholders is subtle such as social identification with the team. However, unless the measure is related to some measure of successor performance (e.g. attendance or merchandise sold), though interesting, the utility of identifying the relationship may be limited. It is also possible that the study did not examine long enough time lags. If it took three years for the message of a charismatic to reach internal stakeholders, it may take longer for that same message to reach external stakeholders.

### Personnel Turnover

Even though approximately half of the successors changed field managers in the first year following succession, the findings do not suggest an association between charismatic executive succession and personnel turnover. This is inconsistent with the indirect and qualitative findings of past research on the topic of executive succession. Recall, however, that the current research focused on symbolic change, specifically managerial change in the first year of succession. It should be noted that a follow-up test of the managerial change within three years of succession also suggests no difference between charismatic and noncharismatic successors. The lack of significant findings does not suggest that this line of investigation should be abandoned. Increased personnel turnover would also be theoretically relevant to existing theories of organizational culture change (Schein, 1985) and organizational homogeneity

(Schneider, 1987). Other measures of personnel turnover should be examined. For example, it might be expected that the president might make changes to the top management team (TMT). Also, as previously implied in the discussion of winning percentage, player personnel changes may be required to reach the vision. A follow-up study focused on player turnover may reveal interesting findings regarding the relationship between charismatic successors and personnel turnover, and may help to explain the time-dependent relationship between charisma and winning percentage.

#### Contributions and Strengths of the Current Proposed Study

Theoretical Explanation for Leader Ability in Executive Succession. Bluntly speaking, the current study proposes a theory for distinguishing between types of executive successions. Theories have been proposed for why executive succession, in general, should make a difference (e.g. Gamson & Scotch, 1964; Grusky, 1963), and it has been suggested that leader ability needs to be distinguished when studying executive succession (Day & Lord, 1988; Smith et al., 1984). However, no researcher of which I am aware has attempted to begin with a psychological theory that clarifies how leader ability should be distinguished. No researcher has stated that if executive successors engage in certain behaviors, then certain organizational outcomes are more likely to occur. Indeed, starting with theory is a contribution to the executive succession literature, and is a major strength of the study.

Distant Charismatic Leadership. A second contribution of the current study is the push towards more research on distant charismatic leadership. Despite the original intent of Weber (1947), the pleas of researchers (Yammarino, 1994), and actual research results noting differences between distant and close charismatic leadership (Shamir, 1995), the general bias has been towards examining charismatic leaders in close situations. There are many underlying reasons for why it is important to believe that charisma occurs as a proximal process. Nonetheless, it is fundamental that distant charisma also be considered. For truly radical paradigm shifts to occur, it is necessary for charismatic leaders to influence not only their core in-group, but also individuals with who with the leader has little or no contact. Executives, particularly those at the highest levels, are expected to influence individuals scattered throughout their organization, and individuals outside their organization. When one considers that time is one of the most valued resources for executives, the lack of contact with many stakeholders is highlighted even more. For example, executives in global organizations are challenged to find ways to influence employees in other countries, often without ever having direct contact with those individuals. The ideal of “one company”, and the very fabric of mission statements induce this need to appeal to others through distal processes.

Organizational Size and Lag Time. Though the above discussion may hint that distant charismatic leadership is a form of social contagion (Meindl, 1990), the current study adds more support for the argument that leadership produces

organizational effects beyond those that can be attributed to environment. Consistent with the review by Day and Lord (1988), the controls included in the current study for organizational size and lag time help to show that beyond the effects of other predictors, leadership explains variance in internal and external organizational outcomes. The study is especially strong because it controls for organizational size and time.

Organizational size has been recommended as a critical control variable in studies of executive succession (e.g. Day & Lord, 1988; Weiner & Mahoney, 1981). Despite the impact of organizational size on performance, many studies do not control for it, and this lack of control may help muddle findings regarding the influence of leadership on organizational performance. The current study controlled for organizational size and industry effects by using a sample from one industry with rules that restrict organizational size. The restrictions in organizational size apply solely to on-the-field personnel. However, MLB organizations likely are similarly structured in other areas as well (e.g. management). Variance that does occur in organizational structure may stem from behavioral decisions made by the team president, and would be related to the primary arguments in this study. However, there is the possibility that some of the variance in organizational size is not attributable to variables of interest.

The current study also provided attention to the variable of time, a critical issue in psychological research (Kelly & McGrath, 1988; McGrath & Kelly, 1986; McGrath & Tschan, 2003). Executive succession studies have often viewed the

effects of succession as quick and potent. However, it has been suggested that lag time is crucial when considering the effects of executive succession (Day & Lord, 1988). Indeed, if the current study had not examined the third year following succession, the most robust finding would have been missed. When considering distant charismatic executive successions, rather than proximal charismatic executive successions, it may be that messages take longer to cascade to followers. An additional issue is how relationships change over time. A study of executive successions that occur within the same year may produce different findings than a study of executive successions that occur over a century. The issue is not which view of time is better, but instead which view of time is more relevant. An argument can be made that, at the macro level, the study using a century of executive successions is more relevant to the question of the overall effects of executive succession. One underlying reason for this is that executive successions occurring over a century are likely to be less dependent on situations of a specific time, and thus more likely to be representative of leadership effects across the overall context. This very fact was demonstrated by the lack of significant findings for the time period of 1973-2000.

Sports Organizations and Sports Executives. Another contribution of the current study is the use of sports organizations. This contribution is twofold. In terms of the executive succession literature, it is the first known study of executive succession in sports using a level of analysis assumed to be appropriate. In sports contexts, plenty of research has highlighted managerial



change and organizational effectiveness, but an extensive literature search failed to locate any prior study of presidency change and its potential influence on organizational outcomes. Thus, it is unclear if and how a change at the highest levels of a sports organization influences overall performance. Logically, it seems that a managerial change would have the most profound effects on individual players. The implicit assumption is that these individual player effects, when aggregated, will have effects on overall performance. However, a change at the presidency level would seemingly have less direct influence over an individual player, but more indirect influence, and also more influence over the structure of the organization and external organizational outcomes (e.g. attendance).

It seems odd that sports executives have been ignored by researchers, particularly because of the high level of interest in players. If the interest is in the industry, then the research should have focused on all jobs within the industry, but this has not been the case. For example, Coleman Griffith's landmark consulting project with the Chicago Cubs in the 1930s (1938-1939; see also Singer, 1989) focused exclusively on the manager, coaches, and players. Sports executives may be perceived as part of an administrative function of the organization, but this view is short sighted. The sports executives are responsible for most of the decisions regarding how to keep the organization in business.

Perhaps another reason executive succession in sports has been glossed over in the past is because the information, both predictor and criteria data, needed to conduct the study was not as readily available as was managerial change data. With tomes like *Total Baseball* (Thorn et al., 2001), readily available media guides, and the Internet serving as a stockpile of rich information, the issue of availability is no longer as prominent. It should be mentioned that all-in-one encyclopedias like *Total Baseball* are not yet complete in other sports. For example, the National Basketball Association and the National Hockey League would be difficult to study in the same manner as the current study because the data for these sports has never been archived in the same depth and manner as MLB. The National Football League (NFL), which has no organized history of team presidency, does have a mostly similar cataloging of historical data. In fact, the presidencies of the NFL would make an excellent follow-up study, one that features the use of content analysis for leader categorization, to reaffirm the results of the current study. Also worthy of note is the contribution of societies like SABR and the Pro Football Researchers Association (PFRA). The efforts of these societies have led to the data sources that make it possible to conduct psychological research using sports archives. One result is that the current study is the first known research using sports executives.

The use of sports organizations in the current study helps contribute to the literature in a second way. In terms of overlapping areas between

industrial/organizational psychology and sports psychology, the current study demonstrates another area where organizational research can assist with sports psychology issues. Few would disagree that the findings of this study would be especially appropriate for generalization to MLB executives. However, Day and Lord (1988) advise that findings obtained using sports executives should be considered with caution when generalizing to traditional organizational settings. Weingarden, Borys, and Baltes (2000) disagree with the assertion that findings in sports organizations automatically cannot be generalized to traditional organizations. They argued that sports organizations *are* organizations, and are subject to many of the same phenomena as more typical organizations. In support of this latter view, the job analysis for executives appears to boundary span across industries. It is the tasks and roles of the job that need consideration when generalizing rather than the nomenclature of the industry. This is similar to the issue considered in meta-analysis, where Bullock and Svyantek (1985) argued that one of the steps to ensure quality is to identify the precise domain for the study. An interesting example is that of the MLB manager. Research conducted on MLB managers and motivational techniques might not generalize to managers in manufacturing industries. There is an issue of individual dimensionality (Kingsbury, 1933) when profiling MLB managers. The techniques employed by the MLB manager to motivate players may be qualitatively different from those techniques employed by the manufacturing manager to motivate line workers.

Job Analysis. Ultimately, job analysis is a strongpoint of the current study because job analysis demonstrates that sports executives are similar to more traditional organizational executives. In fact, because no analysis of context is made, past executive succession studies not using job analysis, and that presume executives from different industries are similar, should be more alarming than executive succession studies of sports organizations that begin with job analysis, and then generalize to other organizations. In order to demonstrate converging operations, nontraditional settings like sports organizations are central in importance.

#### Limitations

Lack of Causation. While the current study accounted for many confounds between executive succession and performance criteria it certainly is not a study that demonstrates causation. It merely demonstrated an association between executive succession and selected criteria. An important next step is to determine what, if any, behaviors by an executive successor lead to improvement or deterioration of an organization. For example, charismatic theory was supported as a potential framework for distinguishing leader ability in executive succession studies, so examination of charismatic behaviors (e.g. rhetoric) should be undertaken.

Measure of Charisma. The measure of charisma in this study is an issue. Various researchers have defined charisma differently, and a common definition has not been necessarily achieved. Support for the definition to be used in this

study stems from the theoretical work of Weber (1947), Katz and Kahn (1978), and Shamir et al. (1993), as well as from previous archival research on charismatic leadership (e.g. O'Connor et al., 1995). However, other researchers (e.g. Bass, 1985), particularly those looking at charismatic leadership at lower levels of organizations, have advised more complex definitions of charisma. Even with literature support for the charisma definition that would be used in the current study, caution would be needed in assuming that the influential leaders identified are equivalent to charismatic leaders. The inference is that, within the data sources, the term charismatic leader is interchangeable with influential leader. However if charismatic leaders are a sub-category of influential leaders, then the current study underestimates the effects of charismatic leadership. It is also possible that some charismatic leaders are influential leaders, but other charismatic leaders are not influential. That misclassification would mean an overestimate of the effects of charismatic leadership. Yet another possibility is that charisma and influence have no relationship, in which case, the validity of the current study would be highly suspect. Of course, an equally likely alternative is that the two terms are interchangeable.

A related issue is the classification of executives as influential or not influential. The subject matter experts (SMEs) who selected the influential executives were baseball researchers. However, researchers in industrial/organizational psychology indicate that there may be important differences among subject matter experts. For example, in terms of job analysis,

Mullins and Kimbrough (1988) suggested that for complex jobs, it is important to interview multiple incumbents. Landy and Vasey (1991) found that the most important demographic variable when creating a SME panel is range of experience. The corresponding connection between those conclusions and the current study is that interviews with team baseball presidents may have been a more appropriate, even if less feasible and potentially impossible, method for identifying influential executives. Also, there likely was restriction of range for the baseball researchers who identified influential executives. Most of the baseball researchers probably were high in their experience of analyzing baseball. Possibly this experience would provide them with a bias in favor of identifying more executives as influential than actually were. In other words, experienced baseball researchers are more likely to be familiar with a greater range of leaders, and may include some leaders as influential who would not be considered influential by the general fan. By including more than the actual number of truly perceived influential leaders, the effect size is reduced. Mixing together the influential and noninfluential leaders limits the chances of finding the actual effects that influential executive successors have on followers. This makes particular sense when one considers that much of the work on charismatic leadership has suggested that charismatic leaders emerge few and far between. An equivalent counterargument can be made that baseball researchers are likely to be better judges of influence than the more general fan.

Of course, there is the possibility that the baseball researchers were facing bias already inherent in previously published archival sources that were used to create the archival sources applied to the current study. There is concern that the older archives do not adequately reflect charisma, but instead reflect visibility. For example, some of the MLB team presidents may have been labeled charismatic because they worked for teams that were located in cities with higher volumes of media coverage. Because the archival sources in the current study represent pooled information from already existing public sources, the likelihood of identifying leaders who are better known is enhanced. So, in a sense, this may be an example of the fundamental attribution error, specifically fitting with the propositions made by Meindl, Ehrlich, and Dukerich (1985). Ultimately, this is an issue of construct validity.

The related question is whether the leaders are charismatic or effective? Does an increase in attendance and capturing of a pennant lead to an attribution of charisma? Because the current study does not use a causal design, the exact answer to this question cannot be determined. However, the major thesis within this study is that the charismatic team presidents engaged in the theory-based behaviors, and that these behaviors lead to the organizational outcomes that were measured. The study was grounded in theory and provided case studies representing the theoretical claims, and this is the active support for the argument that MLB team presidents were charismatic and effective, rather than solely being effective.

Accuracy of the Data. The accuracy of the data sources is always a limitation in archival studies. The *Owner and Executive Roster* section from *Total Baseball* (2001) was a valiant first attempt to aggregate all of the primary leaders of MLB organizations. No one had ever taken on that task before, and it proved to be a large undertaking. As a result, several baseball researchers worked together with criteria that were only partially developed. They also used several sources, and those sources were not created specifically for future research, a common issue with archival research. In fact, past research using multiple sources and content analysis has went as far as to create source adjusted scores (Insch, Moore, & Murphy, 1997; see D'Aveni & MacMillan, 1990 for an example). It is possible that there are errors in the Owner and Executive Roster. Some of those errors may relate to what year an executive succession occurred. Also, because the sources were not created with the current research in mind, some of the data for desirable control variables were not available (e.g. payroll). Another potential area of concern is attendance. For the attendance data, it is important to remember that the American League has always counted the number of tickets sold, but the National League, until 1993, counted the number of fans actually in attendance. The National League numbers probably represent a measure with very little error. The American League numbers, however, may be overstated because of season ticket sales. In cases where fans bought tickets, but did not attend, they would still be counted towards the total attendance figure. The season ticket sales may be skewed depending on the



city. So, in the current study, the precision for measuring attendance in the American League is likely lower than that of the National League.

### Recommendations for Future Research and Applications

The current research helps establish a need for more industrial/organizational psychology research that focuses on the topic of executive succession. Clearly, sociologists and strategy researchers have conducted the lion's share of research. Opportunities exist for industrial/organizational psychologists to become involved with the topic of executive succession. For example, the lack of findings in the current study regarding the second year following succession suggest a need to investigate potential dormancy effects in leader ability studies of executive succession. Further, an additional methodological approach can be taken to verify and build upon the current findings. Rather than relying on *Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia* (Pietrusza et al., 2000), the archives of the *Sporting News* might be examined for indicators of charisma, or lack thereof, at the time of succession.

Additionally, archival studies frequently use multiple-judge panels in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of error. The assumption is that the error is randomized across different raters, ensuring that no bias stems from the process. There are certainly limitations to the multiple-judge panel approach. For example, if the judges are all trained by the same individual, then the error present may be equal to the amount anticipated with a single judge. Also, if the overarching goal is to avoid experimenter bias, then it is essential that the

training of the judges be provided in a manner that does not allow for the trainer's bias to show. The current study had limited opportunities for experimenter bias. Indirectly, the multi-rater panel was composed from those who helped gather information for the archival sources. The opportunity for experimenter bias occurred when I reviewed the archival sources and selected the information to be used in analysis while knowing what the ideal findings would be. The chances of bias from this event likely were limited. Nonetheless, a replication of the current study should consider using a multiple-judge panel in order to add even greater strength to the measure.

Also, as previously noted, football has plenty of the same data (e.g. winning percentage, attendance, and head coach turnover) as baseball. However, football has neither the comprehensive history of owners and executives nor the comprehensive biographical encyclopedia of owners and executives. A researcher could work in conjunction with the PFRA to compile a historical list of football owners and executives, or general managers. Without an existing measure of influence or charisma, the study would require a SME panel to determine which of the executive successors belong in which category, but media or fans might be a potential source. The advantage is that a study on football executive succession would not need to reinvent the wheel. Instead, it could use the lessons learned from this study as a springboard.

Media organizations may also provide an interesting source of data for future studies. Regulations that help limit market share help control for

organizational size. It might also be expected that executive successions in the media organizations would receive ample coverage from media outlets, making archival data readily available. These reasons, combined with several others, may make media organizations an excellent sample for study.

In general, more research is needed that separates executive successors based on leader ability. Research on charismatic theory as a distinguishing mechanism should be continued, but also research should be conducted that uses other theories in an attempt to distinguish leader ability. Closely associated with further studies of charismatic leadership and executive succession is the need to include measures of performance that represent different stakeholders. All executive succession studies should measure the effects of a successor on internal and external stakeholders.

Future research should continue in the direction suggested by Shamir (1995) so that differences between close and distant leaders can be identified. Moreover, Shamir suggested that research should examine predictors and criteria that are relevant to charismatic leaders in distant situations, including studies of impression formation related to distant leadership. Plenty of work remains undone in that realm. Special attention should be given to the perceptions that participants have of the jobs that distant leaders do. For example, Katz and Braly (1933) found that individuals had clear schematas of Turks, despite never having met a Turk. The same may be true for many of the top leadership jobs that distant leaders hold. The accuracy of participant beliefs

regarding the roles and responsibilities of many distant leader jobs may be limited. It would be interesting to examine how inaccuracies in perceptions of roles and responsibilities are related to perceptions of charisma. Perhaps jobs that are viewed as having certain roles and responsibilities would also be more likely to be associated with attributions of charisma.

Previous recommendations have suggested that executive succession research needs to be conducted using different approaches, including more experimental research (Kesner & Sebor, 1994). I would add that more studies should use triangulation. Similar attempts have been made in other areas of leadership research (e.g. Berson, Jung, & Termizi, 1997). One method that seems particularly appealing is what I would refer to as a “monthly update” method. Specifically, this method would allow researchers to examine impression formation in distant leadership longitudinally, by providing a periodic news update to participants regarding something that a distant leader said. Independent variables might include type of organization, consistency of the source’s message, credibility of the source, time between news updates, and number of news updates. Another interesting independent variable would be the manipulation of whether or not participants also receive news updates citing close followers of distant leaders (Waldman & Yammarino, 1999). Further manipulation might examine the effects of whether or not the message of the close follower of a distant leader is consistent with the message of the distant leader. Monthly measures of outcome variables would be taken, allowing tests

for the effects of time on distant charismatic leadership. This is just one example of the creative methods that might be employed to investigate the psychological effects of distant charismatic leaders on followers.

Two other recommendations for further research stand out. First, the current research would delve into the challenge of examining nontraditional settings, and associated nontraditional outcomes. That trend should be continued, and is closely related to the use of job analysis in executive succession studies. In the more traditional corporate setting, measures of follower effects such as trainee motivation, and average job tenure after executive succession would be interesting to examine in some industries. Specific to charismatic executive succession, magazine published lists related to Top 100 ethical organizations, or Best Companies to Work for might provide new insights. Attention should also be given to outcomes associated with executive succession that involves a charismatic leader as the executive predecessor rather than as the executive successor. Does employee theft increase? Does organizational citizenship behavior decrease? Do donations to local charities decrease? These variables are all related to strategy of an organization, and are likely to be influenced by an executive succession.

Preexisting measures of charisma remain elusive. Likely, this is due to the versatile nature of charisma, and the fact that charismatic leaders are few and far between. Some preexisting measures do exist, but often do not provide an accurate operationalization of charisma. Models like the one provided by

Shamir et al. (1993) help direct researchers, through identification of follower effects, in measuring charisma. Researchers should continue to seek out capable sources that define the distinctions between charismatic and noncharismatic leaders. Ultimately, a guide to leadership content sources, including statements of how to divide these sources in terms of charismatic and noncharismatic leadership, needs to be created by a team of industrial/organizational psychologists. This would be an excellent addition to the source pool, and might allow better measurement of charismatic leadership across studies. Granted, a sourcebook as described above would only provide direction for archival research. Validated measures currently exist for measuring some forms of charismatic leadership in the present. However, even these measures should include consideration of a multi-method approach, one that includes the gathering of outcome data. Follower effects, tangible and psychological, define charisma.

From an application standpoint, findings from the current study suggest that organizations should consider indicators of charisma, or at least pronounced indicators of leader ability, when working on a succession plan. As research mounts suggesting that executive successors fall into different categories, and that some executive successors have more profound effects than others, it becomes a responsibility of organizations to protect their own survival and prosperity through the selection of capable executive successors. The impetus on organizations is to find methods for locating potential executive successors

who may be charismatic, and then to gear selection processes towards these individuals. Of course, this is not an easy task, and so the application becomes qualified by the level of investment and accuracy of prediction.

In summary, the psychological research on executive succession is in need of attention. The current research will hopefully stimulate interest in an important topic that has been mostly neglected by industrial/organizational psychologists. The findings indicate that executive succession can make a difference in organizational effectiveness variables, and that charisma may well be a mechanism responsible for effective executive succession.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup>The author wishes to thank Marcus Dickson for pointing out this intricate confound related specifically to the assignment of United Methodist ministers.

<sup>2</sup>Some salary data were published in congressional hearings investigating MLB's antitrust exemption, but the data were scattered (Quirk & Fort, 1992). Prior to the late 1960s, players were forbidden to discuss salaries with other players (Korr, 2002).



Table 1.

## Criteria for Executive Successors

| Issue   | Resolution   |
|---|--|
| Executive successor lasts three full seasons  | Include in data  |
| Executive successor lasts less than three full seasons  | Do not include in data   |
| Multiple executive predecessors in the season prior to an executive succession                                  | Treat as one predecessor   |
| Executive succession occurs during a season   | Season of succession is dropped from the data  |
| Two individuals listed as president for overlapping years   | The second individual's succession will be dismissed because there is effectively no full change in the presidency |
| Individual changes their formal title   | Consider as if there is no executive succession  |
| First president in a team's history   | Do not consider as an executive successor – no comparison data   |
| First president following a team's city change  | Do not consider as an executive successor – different fans   |
| Executive succession for teams that have folded   | Include in data  |
| Former team that has changed cities is replaced in former city by a new team. There is no break in the timeline | Include in data, if new team president meets other criteria  |
| Team changes name, but remains in the same city   | Treat as if there is no change   |
| Two executive successors take over at once  | Treat as an executive succession   |
| No president listed for a year(s)   | Treat as executive predecessor data only   |
| Multiple succession for the same individual   | Use only first succession that fits other criteria   |

Table 2.

Sources for Outcomes (Criteria).

| Outcome (Criterion)            | Source  |
|--------------------------------|---|
| Attendance data                | <i>Major League Baseball Attendance</i> section (Tiemann, 2001) of <i>TB</i>  |
| Winning percentage             | <i>Annual Record</i> section of <i>TB</i>                                     |
| Pennant data                   | <i>Postseason Play</i> section (Ivor-Campbell & Pietrusza, 2001) of <i>TB</i> |
| World Series championship data | <i>Postseason Play</i> section (Ivor-Campbell & Pietrusza, 2001) of <i>TB</i> |
| Managerial turnover data       | <i>Team Rosters</i> section of <i>TB</i>                                      |

\**TB* is *Total Baseball*(Thorn, Palmer, & Gershman, 2001).

Table 3.

Descriptive Information of Executive Successors by Charisma.

|                 | Frequency | % of Overall Sample | Ownership Subsample | % of Ownership Subsample | Ownership Subsample % of Overall Frequency |
|-----------------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--|
| Charismatic     | 57        | 40.7                | 44                  | 46.8                     | 77   |
| Not Charismatic | 83        | 59.3                | 50                  | 53.2                     | 60   |
| Total           | 140       | 100                 | 94                  | 100                      |  |

Table 4.

Descriptive Information for the Overall Sample.

|  | <u>N</u> | <u>M</u> | <i>Mdn</i> | Mode | <u>SD</u> | Range | Min   | Max  |
|--|----------|----------|------------|------|-----------|-------|-------|------|
| Number of Years as President for Successor   | 140      | 9.53     | 6.00       | 3.00 | 8.00      | 41    | 3     | 44   |
| Win % for the Year Prior to Succession   | 140      | .480     | .478       |      | .093      | .44   | .25   | .69  |
| Win % for the First Year Following Succession                                      | 140      | .498     | .504       |      | .083      | .46   | .30   | .76  |
| Win % for the Second Year Following Succession                                     | 140      | .493     | .491       |      | .086      | .45   | .27   | .72  |
| Win % for the Third Year Following Succession                                      | 140      | .495     | .500       |      | .084      | .41   | .28   | .69  |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance by League for the Year Prior to Succession         | 140      | -.183    | -.403      |      | 1.05      | 4.57  | -2.20 | 2.37 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance by League for the First Year Following Succession  | 140      | -.060    | -.182      |      | .968      | 4.42  | -2.01 | 2.41 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance by League for the Second Year Following Succession | 140      | -.042    | -.149      |      | .984      | 4.51  | -1.89 | 2.62 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession            | 140      | -.067    | -.142      |      | .967      | 4.34  | -1.83 | 2.50 |

Table 5.

Number of Years as President for Successor for the Overall Sample.

| Number of<br>Years as<br>President | Frequency | % of<br>Overall<br>Sample | Cumulative<br>% |
|------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| 3                                  | 23        | 16.4                      | 16.4            |
| 4                                  | 19        | 13.6                      | 30.0            |
| 5                                  | 12        | 8.6                       | 38.6            |
| 6                                  | 17        | 12.1                      | 50.7            |
| 7                                  | 9         | 6.4                       | 57.1            |
| 8                                  | 9         | 6.4                       | 63.6            |
| 9                                  | 7         | 5.0                       | 68.6            |
| 10                                 | 5         | 3.6                       | 72.1            |
| 11                                 | 2         | 1.4                       | 73.6            |
| 12                                 | 4         | 2.9                       | 76.4            |
| 13                                 | 2         | 1.4                       | 77.9            |
| 14                                 | 3         | 2.1                       | 80.0            |
| 15                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 80.7            |
| 16                                 | 5         | 3.6                       | 84.3            |
| 17                                 | 3         | 2.1                       | 86.4            |
| 18                                 | 3         | 2.1                       | 88.6            |
| 19                                 | 2         | 1.4                       | 90.0            |
| 20                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 90.7            |
| 21                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 91.4            |
| 22                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 92.1            |
| 24                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 92.9            |
| 25                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 93.6            |
| 27                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 94.3            |
| 28                                 | 3         | 2.1                       | 96.4            |
| 29                                 | 2         | 1.4                       | 97.9            |
| 36                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 98.6            |
| 42                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 99.3            |
| 44                                 | 1         | 0.7                       | 100.0           |
| Total                              | 140       | 100.0                     | 100.0           |

Table 6.

## Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for the Overall Sample

(N=140) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .129   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .573** | -.007 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .101   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .405** | -.007 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Third Year following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .221** | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .384** | -.007 | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 7.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage for Overall Sample ( $N=140$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\beta$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,137)$ |
|---|---------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .589    | .347  | .337           | .0672              | .687          | 36.329***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .418    | .175  | .163           | .0790              | 1.538         | 14.486***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | .445    | .198  | .186           | .0755              | 1.539         | 16.889***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 8.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning

Percentage for the Overall Sample ( $N=140$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .022     | .030        | .133    | 1.925 | .056    | .129       | .162    | .133         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .508     | .061        | .574    | 8.317 | .000*** | .573       | .579    | .574         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .018     | .014        | .103    | 1.332 | .185    | .101       | .113    | .103         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .375     | .072        | .406    | 5.224 | .000*** | .405       | .408    | .406         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .038     | .013        | .224    | 2.924 | .004**  | .221       | .242    | .224         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .346     | .069        | .386    | 5.043 | .000    | .384       | .396    | .386         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .



Table 9.

Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for the Overall Sample  
Without Outliers ( $N=139$ ) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .106   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .568** | -.018 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .081   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .393** | -.018 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Third Year following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .209** | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .374** | -.018 | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 10.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage for Overall Sample Without Outliers ( $N=139$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,137)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .580      | .336  | .327           | .0654              | .652          | 34.484***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .403      | .162  | .150           | .0781              | 1.683         | 13.164***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | .432      | .187  | .175           | .0755              | 1.599         | 15.617***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 11.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning

Percentage for the Overall Sample Without Outliers ( $N=139$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .019     | .011        | .116    | 1.661 | .099    | .106       | .141    | .116         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .489     | .060        | .570    | 8.166 | .000*** | .568       | .574    | .570         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .015     | .014        | .089    | 1.130 | .260    | .081       | .096    | .089         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .359     | .071        | .394    | 5.025 | .000*** | .393       | .396    | .394         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .036     | .013        | .216    | 2.794 | .006**  | .209       | .233    | .216         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .338     | .069        | .378    | 4.891 | .000    | .374       | .387    | .378         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 12.

Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for the Overall Sample ( $N=140$ )

## - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .136   | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .786** | -.020  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .718** | .129   | .507** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .080   | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .666** | -.020  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .708** | .101   | .425** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .181*  | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .559** | -.020  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession            | .728** | .221** | .396** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 13.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for Overall

Sample ( $N=140$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\beta$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(3,136)$ |
|---|---------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  | .874    | .764  | .759           | .4749              | 2.226         | 147.065*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession | .815    | .665  | .657           | .5761              | 1.921         | 89.934***  |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  | .787    | .620  | .611           | .6025              | 2.256         | 73.906***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 14.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Attendance for the Overall Sample ( $N=140$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$    | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|--------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .185     | .083        | .094    | 2.229  | .027*   | .136       | .188    | .093         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .532     | .045        | .579    | 11.925 | .000*** | .786       | .715    | .496         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.836    | .574        | .413    | 8.429  | .000*** | .718       | .586    | .351         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .074     | .100        | .037    | .746   | .457    | .080       | .064    | .037         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .419     | .051        | .449    | 8.160  | .000*** | .666       | .573    | .405         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 5.857    | .630        | .513    | 9.296  | .000*** | .708       | .623    | .461         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .114     | .107        | .058    | 1.062  | .290    | .181       | .091    | .056         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .301     | .053        | .328    | 5.658  | .000*** | .559       | .436    | .299         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | 6.755    | .686        | .585    | 9.840  | .000*** | .728       | .645    | .520         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 15.

Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for the Overall Sample Without Outliers ( $N=139$ ) - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .118   | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .783** | -.033  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .704** | .106   | .496** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .072   | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .663** | -.033  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .709** | .081   | .411** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .173*  | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .554** | -.033  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession            | .725** | .209** | .385** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 16.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for Overall Sample Without Outliers ( $N=139$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\beta$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(3,136)$ |
|---|---------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  | .869    | .755  | .749           | .4766              | 2.216         | 138.368*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession | .819    | .671  | .663           | .5714              | 2.098         | 91.644***  |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  | .786    | .618  | .609           | .6035              | 2.327         | 72.756***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$



Table 17.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Attendance for the Overall Sample Without Outliers ( $N=139$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$    | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|--------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .184     | .083        | .095    | 2.204  | .029*   | .118       | .186    | .094         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .532     | .045        | .587    | 11.884 | .000*** | .783       | .715    | .507         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.812    | .592        | .403    | 8.126  | .000*** | .704       | .573    | .346         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .090     | .099        | .045    | .905   | .367    | .072       | .078    | .045         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .423     | .051        | .451    | 8.300  | .000*** | .663       | .581    | .410         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 6.043    | .633        | .520    | 9.542  | .000*** | .709       | .635    | .471         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .120     | .108        | .061    | 1.116  | .266    | .173       | .096    | .059         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .304     | .053        | .331    | 5.689  | .000*** | .554       | .440    | .303         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | 6.800    | .690        | .585    | 9.851  | .000*** | .725       | .647    | .524         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 18.

Number of Years as President for Successor for the Ownership Subsample

( $n=94$ ).

| Number of<br>Years as<br>President | Frequency | % of<br>Overall<br>Sample | Cumulative<br>% |
|------------------------------------|-----------|---------------------------|-----------------|
| 3                                  | 14        | 14.9                      | 14.9            |
| 4                                  | 10        | 10.6                      | 25.5            |
| 5                                  | 2         | 2.1                       | 27.7            |
| 6                                  | 9         | 9.6                       | 37.2            |
| 7                                  | 7         | 7.4                       | 44.7            |
| 8                                  | 9         | 9.6                       | 54.3            |
| 9                                  | 5         | 5.3                       | 59.6            |
| 10                                 | 4         | 4.3                       | 63.8            |
| 11                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 64.9            |
| 12                                 | 3         | 3.2                       | 68.1            |
| 13                                 | 2         | 2.1                       | 70.2            |
| 14                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 71.3            |
| 15                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 72.3            |
| 16                                 | 4         | 4.3                       | 76.6            |
| 17                                 | 3         | 3.2                       | 79.8            |
| 18                                 | 3         | 3.2                       | 83.0            |
| 19                                 | 2         | 2.1                       | 85.1            |
| 20                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 86.2            |
| 21                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 87.2            |
| 22                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 88.3            |
| 24                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 89.4            |
| 25                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 90.4            |
| 27                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 91.5            |
| 28                                 | 3         | 3.2                       | 94.7            |
| 29                                 | 2         | 2.1                       | 96.8            |
| 36                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 97.9            |
| 42                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 98.9            |
| 44                                 | 1         | 1.1                       | 100.0           |
| Total                              | 98        | 100.0                     | 100.0           |

Table 19.

## Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for the Ownership

Subsample ( $n=94$ ) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .100   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .639** | -.054 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .107   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .433** | -.054 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Third Year following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .216*  | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .411** | -.054 | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 20.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage for the Ownership Subsample ( $n=94$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,91)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .653      | .426  | .413           | .0686              | 2.017         | 33.755*** |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .453      | .205  | .187           | .0843              | 1.212         | 11.722*** |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | .475      | .225  | .208           | .0782              | 0.439         | 13.235*** |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 21.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning Percentage for the Ownership Subsample ( $n=94$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .024     | .014        | .134    | 1.690 | .094    | .100       | .174    | .134         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .605     | .074        | .646    | 8.120 | .000*** | .639       | .648    | .645         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .024     | .017        | .131    | 1.401 | .165    | .107       | .145    | .131         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .431     | .092        | .440    | 4.704 | .000*** | .433       | .442    | .440         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .042     | .016        | .238    | 2.581 | .011*   | .216       | .261    | .238         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .389     | .085        | .424    | 4.584 | .000*** | .411       | .433    | .423         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 22.

## Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for the Ownership Subsample

(n=94) - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .145   | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .819** | -.013 | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .760** | .100  | .599** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .066   | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .694** | -.013 | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .731** | .107  | .476** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .164   | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .579** | -.013 | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession            | .742** | .216* | .406** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 23.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for the  
Ownership Subsample ( $n=94$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\beta$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted<br>$r^2$ | SE of<br>the<br>Estimate | Durbin-<br>Watson | $F(3,90)$  |
|---|---------|-------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------------|------------|
| Z-Score Attendance<br>for the First Year<br>Following Succession  | .892    | .796  | .789              | .4617                    | 1.998             | 117.259*** |
| Z-Score Attendance<br>for the Second Year<br>Following Succession | .830    | .689  | .678              | .5801                    | 1.927             | 66.354***  |
| Z-Score Attendance<br>for the Third Year<br>Following Succession  | .803    | .645  | .633              | .5881                    | 2.030             | 54.480***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

Table 24.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Attendance for the Ownership Subsample ( $n=94$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .225     | .096        | .112    | 2.341 | .021*   | .145       | .240    | .111         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .557     | .057        | .580    | 9.730 | .000*** | .819       | .716    | .463         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.506    | .674        | .401    | 6.689 | .000*** | .760       | .576    | .318         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .035     | .121        | .017    | .287  | .775    | .066       | .030    | .017         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .438     | .065        | .448    | 6.685 | .000*** | .694       | .576    | .393         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 5.635    | .738        | .515    | 7.639 | .000*** | .731       | .627    | .449         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .078     | .125        | .040    | .619  | .537    | .164       | .065    | .039         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .312     | .064        | .337    | 4.873 | .000*** | .579       | .457    | .306         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | 6.589    | .782        | .597    | 8.421 | .000*** | .742       | .664    | .529         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .



Table 25.

## Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for the 1901-1972

Subsample ( $n=83$ ) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .256** | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .621** | .082  | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .169   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .416** | .082  | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Third Year following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .277** | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .444** | .082  | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 26.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage for the 1901-1972 Subsample ( $n=83$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,80)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .654      | .428  | .413           | .0728              | .878          | 29.885*** |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .438      | .192  | .171           | .0890              | 1.487         | 9.477***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | .506      | .256  | .237           | .0814              | 1.591         | 13.736*** |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 27.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning

Percentage for the 1901-1972 Subsample ( $n=83$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .039     | .016        | .207    | 2.435 | .017*   | .256       | .263    | .206         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .534     | .075        | .604    | 7.112 | .000*** | .621       | .622    | .602         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .026     | .020        | .136    | 1.346 | .182    | .169       | .149    | .135         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .369     | .092        | .405    | 4.015 | .000*** | .416       | .410    | .404         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .045     | .018        | .242    | 2.499 | .015*   | .277       | .269    | .241         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .368     | .084        | .425    | 4.386 | .000*** | .444       | .440    | .423         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 28.

## Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for the 1901-1972 Subsample

(n=83) - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2      | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|--------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .211*  | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .807** | .034   | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .758** | .256** | .589** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .135   | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .677** | .034   | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .761** | .169   | .492** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |        |        |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |        |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .213*  | 1.000  |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .595** | .034   | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession            | .749** | .277*  | .460** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 29.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for the 1901-1972 Subsample ( $n=83$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(3,79)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  | .884      | .782  | .773           | .4954              | 2.168         | 94.277*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession | .837      | .701  | .690           | .5811              | 1.926         | 61.715*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  | .801      | .641  | .628           | .6112              | 2.303         | 47.055*** |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

Table 30.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Attendance for the 1901-1972 Subsample ( $n=83$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .185     | .114        | .089    | 1.623 | .109    | .211       | .180    | .085         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .525     | .061        | .568    | 8.637 | .000*** | .807       | .697    | .454         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.395    | .745        | .401    | 5.899 | .000*** | .758       | .553    | .310         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .056     | .130        | .027    | .435  | .665    | .135       | .049    | .027         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .371     | .066        | .401    | 5.667 | .000*** | .677       | .538    | .349         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 5.962    | .766        | .559    | 7.786 | .000*** | .761       | .659    | .479         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Third Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .079     | .141        | .039    | .558  | .578    | .213       | .063    | .038         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .286     | .068        | .322    | 4.219 | .000*** | .595       | .429    | .284         |
| Winning Percentage for the Third Year Following Succession  | 6.333    | .853        | .589    | 7.421 | .000*** | .749       | .641    | .500         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 31.

Descriptive Information of Executive Successors by Charisma for Two-Year Successions.

|                 | Frequency | % of Overall Sample | Ownership Subsample | % of Ownership Subsample | Ownership Subsample % of Overall Frequency |
|-----------------|-----------|---------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|--|
| Charismatic     | 57        | 36.1                | 45 <sup>a</sup>     | 45                       | 79   |
| Not Charismatic | 101       | 63.9                | 55                  | 55                       | 54   |
| Total           | 158       | 100                 | 100                 | 100                      |  |

<sup>a</sup>William DeWitt was an owner during his two-year succession, but was not an owner during his three-year succession.

Table 32.

Descriptive Information of the Overall Sample for Two-Year Successions.

|  | <u>N</u> | <u>M</u> | <i>Mdn</i> | Mode | <u>SD</u> | Range | Min   | Max  |
|--|----------|----------|------------|------|-----------|-------|-------|------|
| Number of Years as President for Successor   | 158      | 8.63     | 6.00       | 3.00 | 7.92      | 42    | 2     | 44   |
| Win % for the Year Prior to Succession   | 158      | .480     | .480       |      | .091      | .44   | .25   | .69  |
| Win % for the First Year Following Succession                                      | 158      | .495     | .500       |      | .082      | .46   | .30   | .76  |
| Win % for the Second Year Following Succession                                     | 158      | .491     | .491       |      | .084      | .45   | .27   | .72  |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance by League for the Year Prior to Succession         | 158      | -.191    | -.403      |      | 1.04      | 4.57  | -2.20 | 2.37 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance by League for the First Year Following Succession  | 158      | -.084    | -.187      |      | .959      | 4.42  | -2.01 | 2.41 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance by League for the Second Year Following Succession | 158      | -.086    | -.174      |      | .969      | 4.51  | -1.89 | 2.62 |



Table 33.

Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for Two-Year Successions ( $N=158$ ) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .136*  | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .583** | .012  | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .122   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .415** | .012  | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 34.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage Two-Year Successions ( $N=158$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,155)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .597      | .356  | .348           | .0661              | 1.898         | 42.854***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .431      | .186  | .175           | .0762              | 1.854         | 17.702***  |

\*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 35.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning  
Percentage for Two-Year Successions ( $N=158$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .022     | .011        | .128    | 1.992 | .048*   | .136       | .158    | .128         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .520     | .058        | .581    | 9.016 | .000*** | .583       | .587    | .581         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .025     | .013        | .117    | 1.615 | .108    | .122       | .129    | .117         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .380     | .067        | .414    | 5.706 | .000*** | .415       | .417    | .414         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 36.

## Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for Two-Year Successions

(N=158) - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .160*  | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .787** | .012  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .725** | .136* | .522** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .139*  | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .667** | .012  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .697** | .122  | .437** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 37.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for Two-Year Successions ( $N=158$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(3,154)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  | .874      | .764  | .759           | .4709              | 2.088         | 165.890*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession | .808      | .653  | .646           | .5765              | 2.126         | 96.538***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

Table 38.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations Two-Year

Successions ( $N=158$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$    | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|--------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .194     | .079        | .097    | 2.447  | .016*   | .160       | .193    | .096         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .528     | .043        | .570    | 12.370 | .000*** | .787       | .706    | .485         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.850    | .545        | .414    | 8.903  | .000*** | .725       | .583    | .349         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .148     | .097        | .073    | 1.534  | .127    | .139       | .123    | .073         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .423     | .049        | .452    | 8.545  | .000*** | .667       | .567    | .406         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 5.661    | .615        | .490    | 9.207  | .000*** | .697       | .596    | .437         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 39.

Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for Two-Year Successions Without Outliers ( $N=155$ ) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .123   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .572** | .011  | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .122   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .390** | .011  | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 40.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage Two-Year Successions Without Outliers ( $N=155$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,152)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .584      | .341  | .332           | .06471             | 1.842         | 29.304***  |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .408      | .166  | .155           | .07421             | 1.845         | 15.163***  |

\*\*\* $p < .001$ .



Table 41.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning

## Percentage for Two-Year Successions Without Outliers (N=155) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | <i>t</i> | <i>p</i> | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|----------|----------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |          |          |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .019     | .011        | .117    | 1.772    | .078     | .123       | .142    | .117         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .496     | .057        | .571    | 8.668    | .000***  | .572       | .575    | .571         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |          |          |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .020     | .012        | .118    | 1.598    | .112     | .122       | .129    | .118         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .345     | .066        | .389    | 5.253    | .000***  | .390       | .392    | .389         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 42.

Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for Two-Year Successions  
Without Outliers ( $N=155$ ) - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .160*  | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .784** | .011  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .714** | .123  | .505** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .155*  | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .661** | .011  | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .708** | .122  | .413** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 43.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for Two-Year Successions Without Outliers ( $N=155$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(3,151)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  | .872      | .760  | .755           | .4622              | 1.994         | 159.417*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession | .820      | .672  | .666           | .5476              | 1.965         | 103.145*** |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

Table 44.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations Two-Year

Successions Without Outliers ( $N=155$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$    | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|--------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .200     | .078        | .103    | 2.557  | .012*   | .160       | .204    | .102         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .523     | .042        | .575    | 12.425 | .000*** | .784       | .711    | .495         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.844    | .550        | .410    | 8.803  | .000*** | .714       | .582    | .351         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |        |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .172     | .093        | .087    | 1.855  | .066    | .155       | .149    | .086         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .413     | .047        | .448    | 8.743  | .000*** | .661       | .580    | .407         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 6.007    | .605        | .512    | 9.926  | .000*** | .708       | .628    | .463         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 45.

Intercorrelations Between Winning Percentage Predictors for Two-Year Successions Ownership Subsample ( $n=100$ ) - Hypothesis 1.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3     |
|--|--------|-------|-------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession     |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .114   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .627** | -.052 | 1.000 |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession    |        |       |       |
| 1. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 1.000  |       |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .127   | 1.000 |       |
| 3. Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .441** | -.052 | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

Table 46.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Winning Percentage Two-Year Successions Ownership Subsample ( $n=100$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(2,97)$ |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|-----------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | .644      | .415  | .403           | .06999             | 1.901         | 34.433*** |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | .466      | .217  | .201           | .08295             | 1.953         | 13.446*** |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Table 47.

Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations for Winning Percentage for Two-Year Successions Ownership Subsample ( $n=100$ ) – Hypothesis 1.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .027     | .014        | .147    | 1.892 | .062    | .114       | .189    | .147         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .612     | .075        | .635    | 8.167 | .000*** | .627       | .638    | .634         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .028     | .017        | .150    | 1.672 | .098    | .127       | .167    | .150         |
| Winning Percentage for the Year Prior to Succession         | .443     | .089        | .449    | 4.989 | .000*** | .441       | .452    | .448         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Table 48.

Intercorrelations Between Attendance Predictors for Two-Year Successions  
Ownership Subsample ( $n=100$ ) - Hypothesis 3.

| Predictor  | 1      | 2     | 3      | 4     |
|--|--------|-------|--------|-------|
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession            | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .166*  | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .811** | -.003 | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession            | .770** | .114  | .598** | 1.000 |
| Z-Score for Industry Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |        |       |        |       |
| 1. Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession           | 1.000  |       |        |       |
| 2. Charisma  | .093   | 1.000 |        |       |
| 3. Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession                   | .689** | -.003 | 1.000  |       |
| 4. Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession           | .729** | .127  | .476** | 1.000 |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .



Table 49.

Standard Regression Overall Model Summaries for Attendance for Two-Year Successions Ownership Subsample ( $n=100$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Model   | $\bar{r}$ | $r^2$ | Adjusted $r^2$ | SE of the Estimate | Durbin-Watson | $F(3,96)$  |
|---|-----------|-------|----------------|--------------------|---------------|------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  | .893      | .798  | .792           | .4582              | 1.876         | 126.312*** |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession | .827      | .683  | .673           | .5793              | 1.953         | 69.018***  |

\*\*\*  $p < .001$

Table 50.

## Standard Regression Weights and Semi-Partial Correlations Two-Year

Successions Ownership Subsample ( $n=100$ ) – Hypothesis 3.

| Variable  | <u>B</u> | <u>SE B</u> | $\beta$ | $t$   | $p$     | Zero-order | Partial | Semi-Partial |
|---|----------|-------------|---------|-------|---------|------------|---------|--------------|
| Z-Score Attendance for the First Year Following Succession  |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .239     | .093        | .119    | 2.566 | .012*   | .166       | .253    | .118         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .536     | .055        | .559    | 9.716 | .000*** | .811       | .704    | .446         |
| Winning Percentage for the First Year Following Succession  | 4.679    | .641        | .422    | 7.299 | .000*** | .770       | .597    | .335         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Second Year Following Succession |          |             |         |       |         |            |         |              |
| Charisma  | .059     | .118        | .029    | .502  | .617    | .093       | .051    | .029         |
| Z-Score Attendance for the Year Prior to Succession         | .431     | .063        | .445    | 6.796 | .000*** | .689       | .570    | .390         |
| Winning Percentage for the Second Year Following Succession | 5.603    | .721        | .513    | 7.770 | .000*** | .729       | .621    | .446         |

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

Figure 1. Self-concept theory of charismatic leadership (Shamir, House, & Arthur, 1993).





Figure 2. A model of close and distant CEO charismatic leadership (Waldman & Yammarino, 1999).



Appendix A

Roles of Top Leadership in General

**Selected Title:**

**11-1011.00 - Chief Executives**

Determine and formulate policies and provide the overall direction of companies or private and public sector organizations within the guidelines set up by a board of directors or similar governing body. Plan, direct, or coordinate operational activities at the highest level of management with the help of subordinate executives and staff managers.

## Appendix B

## Roles of Top Leadership in Private Organizations

**This title represents a group of more specific occupations. Summary Report for:  
11-1011.02 - Private Sector Executives**

Determine and formulate policies and business strategies and provide overall direction of private sector organizations. Plan, direct, and coordinate operational activities at the highest level of management with the help of subordinate managers.

**Tasks****Tasks**

Directs, plans, and implements policies and objectives of organization or business in accordance with charter and board of directors.

Directs activities of organization to plan procedures, establish responsibilities, and coordinate functions among departments and sites.

Confers with board members, organization officials, and staff members to establish policies and formulate plans.

Analyzes operations to evaluate performance of company and staff and to determine areas of cost reduction and program improvement.

Reviews financial statements and sales and activity reports to ensure that organization's objectives are achieved.

Directs and coordinates organization's financial and budget activities to fund operations, maximize investments, and increase efficiency.

Assigns or delegates responsibilities to subordinates.

Directs and coordinates activities of business or department concerned with production, pricing, sales, and/or distribution of products.

Directs and coordinates activities of business involved with buying and selling investment products and financial services.

Directs non-merchandising departments of business, such as advertising, purchasing, credit, and accounting.

## Appendix C

## Full Listing of Executive Predecessors and Successors

| Team                    | League          | Executive Predecessor    | Executive Predecessor's Last Full Year as President | Executive Successor         | Executive Successor's First Full Year as President | Executive Successor Considered Influential? |
|-------------------------|-----------------|--------------------------|---|-----------------------------|--|---|
| Cincinnati              | National League | John T. Brush            | 1901  | <i>August Hermann</i>       | 1903   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| New York (Giants)       | National League | Andrew Freedman          | 1902  | <i>John T. Brush</i>        | 1903   | Yes (BBE)                                   |
| Detroit                 | American League | Samuel F. Angus          | 1903  | William H. Yawkey           | 1904   | No  |
| Boston                  | American League | Henry J. Killilea        | 1903  | <i>John I. Taylor</i>       | 1905   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| Washington (First time) | American League | Harry B. Lambert         | 1904  | Thomas C. Noyes             | 1905   | No  |
| Philadelphia            | National League | James Potter             | 1904  | William J. Shettsline       | 1905   | No  |
| Chicago                 | National League | James A. Hart            | 1905  | <i>Charles W. Murphy</i>    | 1906   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| Boston                  | National League | None                     | 1906  | George B. Dovey             | 1907   | No  |
| St. Louis               | National League | Frank D. Robison         | 1906  | M. Stanley Robison          | 1907   | No  |
| Detroit                 | American League | William H. Yawkey        | 1907  | <i>Frank J. Navin</i>       | 1908   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| Cleveland               | American League | John F. Kilfoyl          | 1909  | Charles W. Somers           | 1910   | No  |
| New York (Giants)       | National League | John T. Brush            | 1911  | Harry N. Hempstead          | 1913   | No  |
| Boston                  | National League | John M. Ward             | 1912  | James Gaffney               | 1913   | No  |
| St. Louis               | National League | James C. Jones           | 1912  | Schuyler P. Britton         | 1913   | No  |
| Boston                  | American League | James R. McAleer         | 1912  | Joseph J. Lannin            | 1914   | No  |
| Philadelphia            | National League | Alfred D. Wiler          | 1912  | William F. Baker            | 1914   | No  |
| New York                | American League | Frank J. Farrell         | 1914  | <i>Jacob Ruppert</i>        | 1915   | Yes (BBE)                                   |
| Chicago                 | National League | Charles H. Thomas        | 1915  | <i>Charles H. Weeghman</i>  | 1916   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| Cleveland               | American League | Charles W. Somers        | 1915  | James C. Dunn               | 1916   | No  |
| St. Louis               | American League | Robert L. Hedges         | 1915  | Philip D. Ball              | 1916   | No  |
| Boston                  | American League | Joseph J. Lannin         | 1916  | <i>Harry H. Frazee</i>      | 1917   | Yes (BBE)                                   |
| St. Louis               | National League | Mrs. Schuyler P. Britton | 1916  | <i>W. Branch Rickey</i>     | 1917   | Yes (BBE)                                   |
| Boston                  | National League | James Gaffney            | 1915  | Percy D. Haughton           | 1918   | No  |
| New York (Giants)       | National League | Harry N. Hempstead       | 1918  | <i>Charles A. Stoneham</i>  | 1919   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| Boston                  | National League | Percy D. Haughton        | 1918  | George W. Grant             | 1919   | No  |
| Washington (First time) | American League | Not Named                | 1919  | <i>Clark C. Griffith</i>    | 1920   | Yes (BBE)                                   |
| St. Louis               | National League | W. Branch Rickey         | 1919  | <i>Samuel Breadon</i>       | 1920   | Yes (TB)                                    |
| Chicago                 | National League | Charles H. Weeghman      | 1918  | <i>William L. Veeck Sr.</i> | 1920   | Yes (BBE)                                   |

|                   |                 |                        |      |                                |      |           |
|-------------------|-----------------|------------------------|------|--------------------------------|------|-----------|
| Philadelphia      | American League | Benjamin F. Shibe      | 1921 | Thomas S. Shibe                | 1922 | No        |
| Cleveland         | American League | James C. Dunn          | 1921 | Ernest S. Barnard              | 1923 | No        |
| Boston            | American League | Harry H. Frazee        | 1922 | Robert Quinn                   | 1924 | No        |
| Brooklyn          | National League | Charles H. Ebbets      | 1924 | <i>Wilbert Robinson</i>        | 1926 | Yes (BBE) |
| Boston            | National League | J. A. Robert Quinn     | 1926 | Emil E. Fuchs                  | 1927 | No        |
| Cleveland         | American League | Ernest S. Barnard      | 1927 | Alva Bradley                   | 1928 | No        |
| Brooklyn          | National League | Wilbert Robinson       | 1929 | Frank B. York                  | 1930 | No        |
| Cincinnati        | National League | C. J. McDiarmid        | 1929 | <i>Sidney Weil</i>             | 1930 | Yes (TB)  |
| Chicago           | American League | Charles A. Comiskey    | 1931 | J. Louis Comiskey              | 1932 | No        |
| Philadelphia      | National League | L. Charles Ruch        | 1932 | Gerald P. Nugent               | 1933 | No        |
| Brooklyn          | National League | Frank B. York          | 1932 | Stephen W. McKeever            | 1933 | No        |
| Boston            | American League | Robert Quinn           | 1932 | <i>Thomas A. Yawkey</i>        | 1933 | Yes (BBE) |
| Pittsburgh        | National League | Barney Dreyfuss        | 1931 | <i>William E. Benswanger</i>   | 1933 | Yes (TB)  |
| St. Louis         | American League | Philip D. Ball         | 1933 | Louis B. Von Weise             | 1934 | No        |
| Cincinnati        | National League | Sidney Weil            | 1933 | <i>Powel Crosley Jr.</i>       | 1934 | Yes (TB)  |
| Chicago           | National League | William L. Veeck Sr.   | 1933 | <i>Phillip K. Wrigley</i>      | 1935 | Yes (BBE) |
| New York (Giants) | National League | Charles A. Stoneham    | 1935 | <i>Horace C. Stoneham</i>      | 1936 | Yes (BBE) |
| Boston            | National League | Emil E. Fuchs          | 1935 | J. A. Robert Quinn             | 1936 | No        |
| Detroit           | American League | Frank J. Navin         | 1935 | Walter O. Briggs Sr.           | 1936 | No        |
| Philadelphia      | American League | John D. Shibe          | 1936 | <i>Connie Mack</i>             | 1937 | Yes (BBE) |
| St. Louis         | American League | Louis D. Von Weise     | 1936 | Donald L. Barnes               | 1937 | No        |
| New York          | American League | Jacob Ruppert          | 1938 | <i>Edward G. Barrow</i>        | 1939 | Yes (BBE) |
| Brooklyn          | National League | Stephen W. McKeever    | 1938 | <i>Leland S. MacPhail Sr.</i>  | 1939 | Yes (BBE) |
| Chicago           | American League | Harry Grabiner         | 1940 | Grace Comiskey                 | 1941 | No        |
| Philadelphia      | National League | Gerald P. Nugent       | 1942 | <i>Robert M. Carpenter Jr.</i> | 1944 | Yes (TB)  |
| Boston            | National League | J. A. Robert Quinn     | 1944 | <i>Louis R. Perini</i>         | 1945 | Yes (BBE) |
| Pittsburgh        | National League | William E. Benswanger  | 1945 | Frank E. McKinney              | 1947 | No        |
| Cincinnati        | National League | Powel Crosley Jr.      | 1945 | <i>Warren C. Giles</i>         | 1947 | Yes (TB)  |
| Cleveland         | American League | Alva Bradley           | 1945 | <i>William L. Veeck Jr.</i>    | 1947 | Yes (BBE) |
| New York          | American League | Leland S. MacPhail Sr. | 1947 | <i>Daniel R. Topping</i>       | 1948 | Yes (TB)  |
| St. Louis         | American League | Donald L. Barnes       | 1945 | Richard C. Muckerman           | 1948 | No        |
| Cleveland         | American League | William L. Veeck Jr.   | 1949 | Ellis W. Ryan                  | 1950 | No        |
| St. Louis         | National League | Robert E. Hannegan     | 1948 | <i>Fred M. Saigh Jr.</i>       | 1950 | Yes (TB)  |



|                          |                 |                         |      |                                    |      |           |
|--------------------------|-----------------|-------------------------|------|------------------------------------|------|-----------|
| Pittsburgh               | National League | Frank E. McKinney       | 1950 | <i>John W. Galbreath</i>           | 1951 | Yes (TB)  |
| Brooklyn                 | National League | W. Branch Rickey        | 1949 | <i>Walter F. O'Malley</i>          | 1951 | Yes (BBE) |
| St. Louis                | National League | Fred M. Saigh Jr.       | 1952 | <i>August A. Busch Jr.</i>         | 1953 | Yes (TB)  |
| Cleveland                | American League | Ellis W. Ryan           | 1952 | Myron H. Wilson Jr.                | 1953 | No        |
| Detroit                  | American League | Walter O. Briggs Sr.    | 1951 | Walter O. Briggs Jr.               | 1953 | No        |
| Washington (First time)  | American League | Clark C. Griffith       | 1955 | <i>Calvin R. Griffith</i>          | 1956 | Yes (TB)  |
| Milwaukee                | National League | Louis R. Perini         | 1956 | Joseph F. Cairnes                  | 1957 | No        |
| Baltimore (Orioles)      | American League | James Keelty Jr.        | 1959 | <i>Leland S. MacPhail Jr.</i>      | 1960 | Yes (BBE) |
| Kansas City (A's)        | American League | Parke Carroll           | 1960 | <i>Charles O. Finley</i>           | 1961 | Yes (BBE) |
| Detroit                  | American League | William O. DeWitt       | 1960 | <i>John E. Fetzer</i>              | 1961 | Yes (BBE) |
| Chicago                  | American League | William L. Veeck Jr.    | 1960 | Arthur C. Allyn Jr.                | 1962 | No        |
| Milwaukee                | National League | Joseph F. Cairnes       | 1961 | John J. McHale                     | 1962 | No        |
| Cincinnati               | National League | Powel Crosley Jr.       | 1960 | <i>William O. DeWitt</i>           | 1962 | Yes (TB)  |
| Cleveland                | American League | Myron H. Wilson Jr.     | 1962 | <i>Gabriel H. Paul</i>             | 1963 | Yes (BBE) |
| Baltimore (Orioles)      | American League | Leland S. MacPhail Jr.  | 1965 | Jerold C. Hoffberger               | 1966 | No        |
| Cincinnati               | National League | William O. DeWitt       | 1966 | <i>Francis L. Dale</i>             | 1967 | Yes (TB)  |
| New York                 | American League | Daniel R. Topping       | 1965 | Michael Burke                      | 1967 | No        |
| New York (Mets)          | National League | Vaughan P. Devine       | 1967 | <i>Joan W. Payson</i>              | 1968 | Yes (BBE) |
| Washington (Second time) | American League | James H. Lemon          | 1968 | Robert E. Short                    | 1969 | No        |
| Pittsburgh               | National League | John W. Galbreath       | 1969 | <i>Daniel M. Galbreath</i>         | 1970 | Yes (TB)  |
| Chicago                  | American League | Arthur C. Allyn Jr.     | 1969 | John W. Allyn                      | 1970 | No        |
| Los Angeles              | National League | Walter F. O'Malley      | 1969 | Peter O'Malley                     | 1970 | No        |
| Cleveland                | American League | Gabriel H. Paul         | 1971 | Nick Mileti                        | 1972 | No        |
| Atlanta                  | National League | William C. Bartholomay  | 1972 | Daniel J. Donahue                  | 1973 | No        |
| Philadelphia             | National League | Robert M. Carpenter Jr. | 1972 | Robert M. Carpenter III            | 1973 | No        |
| Cincinnati               | National League | Francis L. Dale         | 1972 | <i>Robert L. Howsam</i>            | 1974 | Yes (TB)  |
| Texas                    | American League | Robert E. Short         | 1974 | Bradford G. Corbett                | 1975 | No        |
| New York (Mets)          | National League | Joan W. Payson          | 1975 | Lorinda de Roulet                  | 1976 | No        |
| Atlanta                  | National League | Daniel J. Donahue       | 1975 | <i>R. E. (Ted) Turner</i>          | 1976 | Yes (BBE) |
| San Francisco            | National League | Horace C. Stoneham      | 1975 | <i>Robert A. Lurie/Bud Herseth</i> | 1976 | Yes (TB)  |
| Boston                   | American League | Thomas A. Yawkey        | 1976 | Jean R. Yawkey                     | 1977 | No        |
| Houston                  | National League | T. H. Neyland           | 1975 | Talbot M. Smith                    | 1977 | No        |
| Anaheim                  | American League | Arthur E. Patterson     | 1976 | <i>Gene Autry</i>                  | 1978 | Yes (BBE) |

|                     |                 |                             |      |                               |      |           |
|---------------------|-----------------|-----------------------------|------|-------------------------------|------|-----------|
| San Diego           | National League | Emil J. Bavasi              | 1976 | <i>Ray A. Kroc</i>            | 1978 | Yes (BBE) |
| Chicago             | National League | Phillip K. Wrigley          | 1976 | William J. Hagenah Jr.        | 1978 | No        |
| Cincinnati          | National League | Robert L. Howsam            | 1978 | Richard Wagner                | 1979 | No        |
| Seattle (Mariners)  | American League | Danny Kaye and Lester Smith | 1979 | Daniel F. O'Brien             | 1980 | No        |
| New York (Mets)     | National League | Lorinda de Roulet           | 1979 | <i>Fred Wilpon</i>            | 1980 | Yes (TB)  |
| Houston             | National League | Talbot M. Smith             | 1980 | <i>Albert L. Rosen</i>        | 1981 | Yes (BBE) |
| Texas               | American League | Bradford G. Corbett         | 1979 | Eddie Chiles                  | 1981 | No        |
| New York            | American League | Albert L. Rosen             | 1979 | <i>George M. Steinbrenner</i> | 1981 | Yes (BBE) |
| Chicago             | American League | William L. Veeck Jr.        | 1980 | <i>Jerry M. Reinsdorf</i>     | 1981 | Yes (BBE) |
| Oakland             | American League | Charles O. Finley           | 1980 | Roy Eisenhardt                | 1981 | No        |
| Philadelphia        | National League | Robert M. Carpenter III     | 1981 | Bill Giles                    | 1982 | No        |
| Baltimore (Orioles) | American League | Jerold C. Hoffberger        | 1982 | Edward B. Williams            | 1983 | No        |
| San Diego           | National League | Ray A. Kroc                 | 1983 | Joan Kroc                     | 1984 | No        |
| Minnesota           | American League | Calvin R. Griffith          | 1984 | <i>Carl R. Pohlad</i>         | 1985 | Yes (TB)  |
| Chicago             | National League | James E. Finks              | 1984 | <i>Dallas Green</i>           | 1985 | Yes (BBE) |
| Cincinnati          | National League | Robert L. Howsam            | 1985 | <i>Marge Schott</i>           | 1986 | Yes (BBE) |
| Montreal            | National League | John J. McHale              | 1986 | Claude R. Brochu              | 1987 | No        |
| Cleveland           | American League | Patrick J. O'Neill          | 1986 | Richard E. Jacobs             | 1987 | No        |
| Atlanta             | National League | R. E. (Ted) Turner          | 1986 | William C. Bartholomay        | 1987 | No        |
| Pittsburgh          | National League | Malcolm Prine               | 1987 | Carl Barger                   | 1988 | No        |
| Texas               | American League | Eddie Chiles                | 1987 | Michael H. Stone              | 1988 | No        |
| Boston              | American League | Jean R. Yawkey              | 1988 | John L. Harrington            | 1989 | No        |
| Baltimore (Orioles) | American League | Edward B. Williams          | 1988 | <i>Lawrence Lucchino</i>      | 1989 | Yes (TB)  |
| Toronto             | American League | R. Howard Webster           | 1988 | Paul Beeston                  | 1989 | No        |
| Chicago             | National League | John W. Madigan             | 1988 | Stanton Cook                  | 1989 | No        |
| Texas               | American League | Michael H. Stone            | 1990 | J. Thomas Schieffer           | 1991 | No        |
| Anaheim             | American League | Gene Autry                  | 1989 | Richard M. Brown              | 1991 | No        |
| San Diego           | National League | Joan Kroc                   | 1990 | <i>Tom Werner</i>             | 1991 | Yes (TB)  |
| Oakland             | American League | Roy Eisenhardt              | 1989 | Walter J. Haas                | 1991 | No        |
| Seattle (Mariners)  | American League | Jeff Smulyan                | 1991 | John W. Ellis                 | 1992 | No        |
| Houston             | National League | Dr. John J. McMullen        | 1991 | Drayton McLane Jr.            | 1993 | No        |
| Pittsburgh          | National League | Douglas D. Danforth         | 1991 | Mark Sauer                    | 1993 | No        |
| Detroit             | American League | Glenn E. (Bo) Schembechler  | 1991 | Michael Ilitch                | 1993 | No        |

|                      |                 |                  |      |                         |             |                 |
|----------------------|-----------------|------------------|------|-------------------------|-------------|-----------------|
| San Francisco        | National League | Robert A. Lurie  | 1992 | Peter A. Magowan        | 1993        | No              |
| Kansas City (Royals) | American League | Ewing Kauffman   | 1992 | David D. Glass          | 1994        | No              |
| San Diego            | National League | Tom Werner       | 1993 | <i>John Moores</i>      | <i>1994</i> | <i>Yes (TB)</i> |
| Baltimore (Orioles)  | American League | Not Named        | 1993 | Peter Angelos           | 1994        | No              |
| Chicago              | National League | Stanton Cook     | 1993 | Andy MacPhail           | 1995        | No              |
| St. Louis            | National League | Stuart Meyer     | 1994 | Mark C. Lamping         | 1995        | No              |
| Cincinnati           | National League | Marge Schott     | 1995 | John Allen              | 1996        | No              |
| Toronto              | American League | Paul Beeston     | 1994 | Sam Pollock             | 1996        | No              |
| Oakland              | American League | Walter J. Haas   | 1994 | <i>Steven C. Schott</i> | <i>1996</i> | <i>Yes (TB)</i> |
| Pittsburgh           | National League | Mark. Sauer      | 1995 | Kevin S. McClatchy      | 1997        | No              |
| Anaheim              | American League | Richard M. Brown | 1995 | Michael Eisner          | 1997        | No              |
| Philadelphia         | National League | Bill Giles       | 1997 | David Montgomery        | 1998        | No              |
| Los Angeles          | National League | Peter O'Malley   | 1997 | Rupert Murdoch          | 1998        | No              |

\*BBE = Baseball: The Biographical Encyclopedia (indicates that a full biography exists for the executive)

\*TB = Total Baseball (indicates that the executive's succession was referred to in the respective team's history)

## Appendix D

## Two-Year Successions

| Team               | League          | Executive Predecessor | Executive Predecessor's Last Full Year as President | Executive Successor      | Executive Successor's First Full Year as President | Executive Successor Considered Influential? |
|--------------------|-----------------|-----------------------|---|--------------------------|--|---|
| Detroit            | American League | James D. Burns        | 1901  | Samuel F. Angus          | 1902   | No  |
| Philadelphia       | National League | Alfred J. Reach       | 1902  | James Potter             | 1903   | No  |
| Chicago            | National League | Charles Murphy        | 1913  | Charles H. Thomas        | 1914   | No  |
| Cincinnati         | National League | August Hermann        | 1927  | C. J. McDiarmid          | 1928   | No  |
| Philadelphia       | National League | William F. Baker      | 1930  | L. Charles Ruch          | 1931   | No  |
| St. Louis          | American League | Richard C. Muckerman  | 1948  | <i>William O. DeWitt</i> | <i>1949</i>  | <i>Yes (TB)</i>                             |
| Chicago            | American League | Mrs. Grace Comiskey   | 1956  | Charles A. Comiskey II   | 1957   | No  |
| Detroit            | American League | Walter O. Briggs Jr.  | 1956  | Harvey R. Hansen         | 1958   | No  |
| Houston            | National League | Roy Hofheinz          | 1971  | Reuben Askanase          | 1972   | No  |
| Houston            | National League | Reuben Askanase       | 1973  | T. H. Neyland            | 1974   | No  |
| Anaheim            | American League | Robert Reynolds       | 1974  | Arthur E. Patterson      | 1975   | No  |
| Cleveland          | American League | Nick Mileti           | 1974  | Alva T. Bonda            | 1976   | No  |
| New York           | American League | Gabriel H. Paul       | 1977  | <i>Albert L. Rosen</i>   | <i>1978</i>  | <i>Yes (BBE)</i>                            |
| Chicago            | National League | William J. Hagenah    | 1981  | Andrew J. McKenna        | 1982   | No  |
| Houston            | National League | Al Rosen              | 1985  | Dick Wagner              | 1986   | No  |
| Pittsburgh         | National League | Daniel M. Galbreath   | 1985  | Malcolm Prine            | 1986   | No  |
| St. Louis          | National League | August A. Busch Jr.   | 1989  | Fred L. Kuhlmann         | 1990   | No  |
| Seattle (Mariners) | American League | Charles G. Armstrong  | 1989  | Jeff Smulyan             | 1990   | No  |
| St. Louis          | National League | Fred L. Kuhlmann      | 1991  | Stuart Meyer             | 1992   | No  |
| Texas              | American League | J. Thomas Schieffer   | 1997  | Thomas O. Hicks          | 1999   | No  |

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**ABSTRACT****EXECUTIVE SUCCESSION,  
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE, AND CHARISMA**

by

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December 2004

Advisor: Dr. Marcus Dickson  
Major: Psychology (Industrial/Organizational)  
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Past research on executive succession (ES) provides mixed results as to whether successors influence organizational outcome variables. The current research first reviews the roles and responsibilities of executives. Following this review, in-depth coverage of ES research is provided. Literature on charisma is reviewed, and charisma is presented as a potential distinguishing mechanism between effective and ineffective ES. Hypotheses related to ES and criteria are proposed that suggest charismatic successors are likely to be more effective than are noncharismatic successors. The research examined the relationship between charisma and succession as measured by change in internal organizational performance, external organizational performance, and personnel turnover. The research employed archival data from a nontraditional organizational setting, specifically ES at the team president level in Major League Baseball. Multiple criteria including winning percentage, pennants and World

Series championships, attendance, and managerial turnover were examined. Data were examined at one, two, and three-year lags. Standard multiple regression was used as the primary statistical analysis with the Chi-square test as a supplementary statistic. Results were consistent with the hypotheses associated with winning percentage, pennants, World Series, and attendance and suggest that charismatic successors make a difference in organizational outcomes, and that nontraditional settings should be considered for inclusion in future research. No relationship was found for charisma and personnel turnover. The results also suggest that more research should be devoted to investigating charisma and associated effects as a key mechanism in distinguishing between effective and ineffective ES.

## **AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT**

STEVEN M. WEINGARDEN

Steve Weingarden was born in Detroit, Michigan, and is a devoted Detroit Tigers fan. Steve's interest in baseball-related research began when he would accompany his dad to bowling league, and win candy money by stumping the adults with obscure baseball trivia. The interest in baseball progressed as he began studying statistics more carefully while playing Strat-O-Matic baseball.

Steve's interest in leadership also likely emerged from childhood, as he seemed to find himself as the visionary and main contributor for many groups. His ongoing concern for making sure the "little guy" gets treated well in the workplace led to Steve's return to graduate school to pursue industrial/organizational psychology, and to his primary research interest – leadership.

Prior to graduate school, Steve hosted a sports talk show, where one of the recurring guests was the president of SABR. Steve holds a master's degree with a major in industrial/organizational psychology from Wayne State University, a bachelor's degree with a double major in Psychology and English Writing from the University of Pittsburgh, and a diploma in radio broadcasting from the Specs Howard School of Broadcast Arts.

Steve plans to continue to help the little guy in the workplace, and to continue his research on leadership. He hopes to continue expanding the realm of industrial/organizational psychology to include sport organizations.